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INTRODUCTION
purred by the growth in travel and tourism, the airline in-
dustry has acquired a prominent place in the global econ-
omy.
1
Despite gradual liberalization over the last few decades,
the industry continues to face significant regulatory barriers,
which have arguably failed to keep pace with the times. One
such constraint relates to the stringent rules pertaining to for-
eign ownership of airline companies. This is attributable to the
way the regulatory mechanism governing the airline industry
was established more than half a century ago and continues to
the present day.
2
There is limited visibility of any possible over-
haul of the regulatory approaches regarding ownership in the
airline industry.
The global regulation of the aviation industry has been prem-
ised on the concept of a “flag carrier,”
3
which is subject to na-
tional laws, as well as bilateral agreements between nations.
4
The “nationality rule”
5
ensures that an airline is necessarily
1. World Economic Forum, ANewRegulatory Model for Foreign Investment
in Airlines 5 (Jan. 2016), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/IP/2016/MO/WEF_AT_NewRegulatoryModel.pdf.
2. ISABELLE LELIEUR, LAW AND POLICY OF SUBSTANTIAL OWNERSHIP AND
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF AIRLINES 1 (2003).
3. A flag carrier is generally a “nationally owned and operated” air carrier.
Dennis A. Duchene, The Third Package of Liberalization in the European Air
Transport Sector: Shying Away from Full Liberalization, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 119,
123 (1995).
4. LELIEUR, supra note 2, at 1; Yu-Chun Chang, George Williams & Chi-
Jui Hsu, The Evolution of Airline Ownership and Control Provisions, 10 J. AIR
TRANSP. MGMT. 161, 161 (2004).
5. The nationality rule stipulates that an airline must be “¶substantially
owned and effectively controlled’ by the citizens of the carrier’s home state.”
S
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owned and controlled by a state or citizens of such a state.
6
Such
a requirement, by which the “substantial ownership and effec-
tive control”
7
(SOEC) of an airline must vest in a state or its cit-
izens, substantially limits the flow of foreign investment into the
airline industry. This not only hampers capital raising activities
by airlines to fund their business, but it also stifles cross-border
mergers and acquisitions activity in the industry, thereby im-
peding the benefits of size and efficiencies that would ultimately
accrue to customers in the form of enhanced options, services,
and reduced cost.
8
While there have been calls for the abolition
of nationality requirements in the airline industry to permit a
free flow of capital investment,
9
there also has been significant
resistance.
10
The foreign investment regime governing the airline industry
has been the subject of considerable debate, both in legal aca-
demia, as well as in the field of air transport management.
11
Given that some of the earliest restrictions emanated from the
United States, it is not surprising that a substantial part of the
Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex Aviatica, 42 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 639, 648 (2011).
6. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 640.
7. While “substantial ownership” refers to ownership of shares in an air-
line company, “effective control” deals with management and supervision of
the airline’s operations. See Brian F. Havel, A New Approach to Foreign Own-
ership of National Airlines, 2001 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 13201, 13217
(2001²2004).
8. See Havel, supra note 7, at 13202; Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at
649; Kirsten Bohmann, The Ownership and Control Requirement in U.S. and
European Union Air Law and U.S. Maritime Law ³ Policy; Consideration;
Comparison, 66 J. AIR L. &COM. 689, 690 (2001); Antigoni Lykotrafiti, Consol-
idation and Rationalization in the Transatlantic Air Transport Market ³ Pro-
spects and Challenges for Competition and Consumer Welfare, 76 J. AIR L. &
COM. 661, 676, 686 (2011).
9. LELIEUR, supra note 2, at 151²52.
10. See, e.g., Angela Edwards, Foreign Investment in the U.S. Airline Indus-
try: Friend or Foe?, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 595 (1995).
11. LELIEUR, supra note 2; BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW
REGIME FOR INTERNATIONALAVIATION 164²65 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2009); Chang,
et al., supra note 4; Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5; Alex Cosmas, Peter Belo-
baba & William Swelbar, Framing the Discussion on Regulatory Liberaliza-
tion: A Stakeholder Analysis of Open Skies, Ownership and Control, MIT INT’L
CENTRE AIR TRANSP. ³ WHITE PAPER, http://web.mit.edu/air-
lines/news/news_new_documents_files/Cos-
mas_ICAT2008_RegulatoryLiberalization.pdf; Havel, supra note 7. See also in-
fra notes 12²14.
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literature deals with U.S. regulation of foreign investment in the
airline sector.
12
In the past few decades, there has been an in-
creasing focus on the European Union.
13
More recently, the spot-
light has shifted to Asia.
14
This article’s goal is to fill a percepti-
ble gap in the literature by embarking on an analysis of the for-
eign investment regime in India, a country that has not only at-
tained the status of a leading player in the aviation industry, but
one that has also enacted significant legal reforms pertaining to
foreign investment in the aviation sector. This article also cau-
tiously suggests that India’s new regulatory reforms could be a
harbinger for other states.
A study of the foreign investment regime in the airline indus-
try in India is both interesting and timely for at least two rea-
sons. First, India has nearly everything that bodes well for the
growth of an aviation market. It is a country with an ideal geo-
graphical location between the eastern and western hemi-
spheres, a growing middle class population of about three hun-
dred million, and a rapidly developing economy.
15
In 2017, India
attained the status of being the third-largest aviation market³
after the United States and China³in terms of domestic traffic
and the fourth-largest in terms of overall air passenger traffic,
including both domestic and international sectors.
16
As one of
12. Edwards, supra note 10; Constantine Alexandrakis, Foreign Investment
in U.S. Airlines: Restrictive Law is Ripe for Change, 4 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
71, 73 (1993²1994); James E. Gjerset, Crippling United States Airlines: Ar-
chaic Interpretations of the Federal Aviation Act’s Restriction on Foreign Capi-
tal Investments, 7 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173, 175 (1991); Jeffrey Donner
Brown, Note, Foreign Investment in U.S. Airlines, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1269,
1271 (1990); Ved P. Nanda, Substantial Ownership and Control of Interna-
tional Airlines in the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 357, 358 (2002).
13. Bohmann, supra note 8; Lykotrafiti, supra note 8; Allan I. Mendelsohn,
The United States, the European Union and the Ownership and Control of Air-
lines, 2001 AVIATION L. & POL’Y 13171, 13173²74 (2003).
14. Jae Woon Lee & Michelle Dy, Mitigating ¶Effective Control’ Restriction
on Joint Venture Airlines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia Case, 40 AIR&SPACE L.
232 (2015); Jae Woon Lee &Michelle Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong
Airways Decisions Before the Air Transport Licencing Authority, 46 HONG
KONG L.J. 175 (2016).
15. MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION, NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY 2016 1
(June 15, 2016) (India), http://www.civilaviation.gov.in/sites/default/files/Fi-
nal_NCAP_2016_15-06-2016.pdf.
16. India Now 3rd Largest Aviation Market in Domestic Air Passenger Traf-
fic: Capa, LIVE MINT (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.livemint.com/Poli-
tics/H9mJDSrD7DZStOeF8BLcaN/India-now-3rd-largest-aviation-market-in-
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the fastest growing aviation markets in the world, India unsur-
prisingly achieved this status much faster than had been previ-
ously predicted.
17
Second, the Indian government has introduced substantial re-
forms to liberalize the aviation sector. Historically, and from the
time that foreign investment was allowed in the sector, signifi-
cant limits were imposed on the extent of such investment. Ini-
tially, a limit of 40 percent was placed on foreign ownership,
18
which was subsequently enhanced to 49 percent.
19
In 2012, the
government removed a barrier that kept foreign airlines from
investing in Indian airlines, and permitted them to own up to 49
percent, subject, of course, to the condition that the SOEC re-
mained in Indian hands.
20
More recently, in 2016, limits have
been lifted on foreign investments (other than by foreign air-
lines), which can now compose up to 100 percent ownership of
an Indian airline.
21
Investments by foreign airlines, however,
are still subject to the 49 percent limit with the SOEC require-
ments.
22
In the same year, the government also revamped its
policy surrounding the civil aviation sector in general.
23
Alt-
hough this has made India one of the more liberalized markets
domestic-air-passen.html; India Becomes 3rd Largest Aviation Market in Do-
mestic Traffic, TIMES INDIA (Mar. 26, 2017), https://timesofindia.indi-
atimes.com/business/india-business/india-becomes-3rd-largest-aviation-mar-
ket-in-domestic-traffic/articleshow/57837992.cms.
17. It earlier was anticipated that India will occupy the third position only
by 2022. India’s Cabinet Approves Civil Aviation Policy, CENTRE AVIATION
(June 15, 2016), http://centreforaviation.com/news/cabinet-approves-civil-avia-
tion-policy-565639; Ramesh Vaidyanathan, India’s New Aviation Policy: Will
It Be a Game Changer?, 29 AIR&SPACE L. 1 (2016).
18. Paul Hooper, Liberalisation of the Airline Industry in India, 3 J. AIR
TRANSP. MGMT. 115, 116 (1997).
19. Press Note No. 4 (2008): FDI Policy for the Civil Aviation Sector, De-
partment of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try, ¶ 3.3 (Mar. 12, 2008) (India), http://dipp.gov.in/sites/de-
fault/files/pn4_2008_0.pdf [hereinafter Press Note 4 of 2008].
20. Press Note No. 6 (2012 Series): Review of the Policy on Foreign Direct
Investment in the Civil Aviation Sector, Department of Industrial Policy &
Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, (Sept. 20, 2012) (India) [here-
inafter Press Note 6 of 2012].
21. Press Note No. 5 (2016 Series): Review of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) Policy on Various Sectors, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion,
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, (June 24, 2016) (India) [hereinafter Press
Note 5 of 2016].
22. Id.
23. MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION, supra note 15.
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for foreign investment in airline companies, certain barriers,
such as the SOEC requirements for foreign airline investments,
will likely continue to place constraints on significant foreign in-
vestment.
Although India has transitioned from a highly restrictive re-
gime for foreign investment in the airline industry to one that is
among the most liberal in the world within a span of only two
decades, this article argues that the liberalized norms give rise
to tension on several counts that is not easy to resolve. For in-
stance, India’s aviation policy creates a dichotomy between for-
eign airline investors, who face a restrictive regime, and non-
airline investors, who enjoy a liberal regime.
24
Moreover, the
SOEC restrictions that apply to airline investors give rise to sev-
eral issues in their implementation. This is complicated further
by the presence of several interest groups that seek to influence
government policy in this area.
25
These are generally incumbent
airline companies and their controllers, who seek to raise the bar
for new entrants.
26
Even if Indian domestic law on foreign investments can be ad-
dressed, the SOEC requirements under various bilateral agree-
ments between India and other countries, which cater to the op-
eration of flights between those countries, tend to pose a stum-
bling block toward full liberalization. Unlike domestic laws,
which can be reformed unilaterally, India’s ability to unlock the
investment restrictions under such bilateral agreements is
much more circumscribed given that such negotiations occur
within the realm of reciprocity. Despite various shortcomings in
India’s foreign investment policy in the airline sector, the indus-
try has witnessed massive growth.
27
It remains to be seen
whether resolving the regulatory problems will unleash further
potential for growth in India’s airline industry. It will also be
illuminating to see how and to what extent India’s new reforms
will influence other states’ policies.
Part I of this article introduces the specific issues that arise in
the regulation of foreign investment in the airline industry, with
an emphasis on the SOEC restrictions. Part II traces the evolu-
tion of the regulatory regime in India governing foreign invest-
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part III.D.3.
26. Id.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 16²17.
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ment in its airline sector. This article finds that a wholly restric-
tive sector transformed rapidly into a liberal one. Part III delves
into a detailed evaluation of India’s foreign investment norms,
and analyzes various issues and problems emanating therefrom.
These include the disparate treatment of foreign airline inves-
tors and others and the role of various incumbent players, such
as nonresident Indian investors, the state-owned carrier Air In-
dia, and an industry lobby, which have influenced the nature of
the foreign investment regulation. Part IV addresses issues that
India faces in reconciling the treatment of its airlines under bi-
lateral agreements with that conferred under domestic law. Fi-
nally, the article concludes with anticipation that India’s new
approach could impact other states’ foreign investment regimes
in the airline industry.
I. FOREIGN INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY
This article begins with a discussion of foreign investment in
the airline industry from a global perspective. Apart from ana-
lyzing the regime in various countries, both from the purview of
national regulations and of bilateral arrangements entered into
by nations, this Part also highlights the background and ra-
tionale for tight restrictions on foreign investment in the airline
industry. Such a comparative setting will provide the framework
by which the regulation of the Indian aviation sector can be an-
alyzed in detail.
A. Substantial Ownership and Effective Control
Foreign ownership restrictions have been the mainstay of the
airline industry since the first half of the twentieth century.
28
Their origin can be attributed to a fundamental principle of in-
28. See LELIEUR, supra note 2, at 7; Nanda, supra note 12, at 358²60.
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ternational law by which a state’s sovereignty extends to the air-
space above its territory.
29
Such a principle is translated into na-
tionality restrictions through a “double-bolted locking mecha-
nism” consisting of an internal bolt and an external bolt.
30
The internal bolt is represented by ownership restrictions set
out in the national laws and regulations of various countries that
impose limitations on foreign investment.
31
For example, most
countries prescribe SOEC requirements mandating that their
airlines must not only be owned substantially by their own na-
tionals, but that they must also be under effective local control.
32
Substantial ownership requirements are quantitative in na-
ture.
33
For instance, the national rules of Country A may state
that foreign nationals or foreign companies may not own more
than 49 percent of the shares in a Country A airline. Effective
control requirements are, however, trickier, as they are qualita-
tive in nature.
34
Illustratively, an investor X who is a national of
Country B may be said to be in effective control of an airline in
Country A even though investor X holds less than 49 percent of
the shares of an airline. Effective control may be conferred by
means other than substantial ownership of airlines, including
control through contractual rights and protections that may be
conferred upon the foreign investor, by which he or she is able to
exercise de facto control over the airline in Country A.
The external bolt is represented by various bilateral air service
agreements (ASAs) that two countries will enter into to regulate
the flow of air traffic between them.
35
The ASAs prescribe SOEC
requirements so that only airlines from a country that is a party
to the ASA are entitled to take advantage of the benefits of the
agreement. This is achieved by ensuring that each of state that
29. LELIEUR, supra note 2, at 7; Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 644.
Linked to these are restrictions on “cabotage,” which prohibit an airline from
one country from offering flights on wholly domestic routes in another country.
See Havel, supra note 7, at 13203; Brown, supra note 12, at 1273; Bohmann,
supra note 8, at 690; Lykotrafiti, supra note 8, at 666; Havel & Sanchez, supra
note 5, at 646; Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 85.
30. World Economic Forum, supra note 1, at 6; Havel & Sanchez, supra note
5, at 651; Havel, supra note 7, at 13202.
31. Id.
32. Lykotrafiti, supra note 8, at 670²71; Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at
650, 656.
33. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 650.
34. Id. at 650²51.
35. See supra note 30.
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is a party to an ASA “reserves the right to revoke, limit or sus-
pend the traffic rights of any foreign airline designated to oper-
ate service under the ASA if that airline is not substantially
owned and effectively controlled by the other state party (or by
citizens of that other state party).”
36
To illustrate this point, take
the case of Countries A and B, which have entered into an ASA
to regulate air traffic rights between them. The SOEC require-
ments embedded into the ASA will ensure that an airline from
Country C does not acquire SOEC in an airline in Country B to
take advantage of the bilateral arrangements between Coun-
tries A and B in the ASA. This would be particularly important
if Country B has been able to negotiate a more favorable bilat-
eral arrangement with Country A than has Country C. Effec-
tively, the external bolt will ensure that airlines do not engage
in treaty shopping.
37
Given the bilateral nature of the external bolt, it is cumber-
some to unfasten it to allow foreign investment in airlines. The
renowned aviation law scholar, Brian Havel, observes: “Coun-
tries are caught in a kind of prisoner’s dilemma under this sys-
tem. If a country unilaterally allows foreign ownership and con-
trol of its airlines, it risks compromising the access of its airlines
to international routes to other countries.”
38
Hence, even if coun-
tries allow a relaxation of their domestic rules relating to foreign
investment (i.e., the internal lock), they may be constrained in
liberalizing the restrictions under the ASAs (i.e., the external
lock) unless there is bilateral consensus, which may be difficult
to achieve.
With this background regarding the genesis of the SOEC re-
quirements, it is instructive to explore the evolution of the rules,
both nationally and bilaterally, keeping in mind the rationale,
36. World Economic Forum, supra note 1, at 8.
37. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 649 (noting that “the concessions
exchanged between two states cannot be captured by a third state not party to
the deal.”).
38. Havel, supra note 7, at 13203. “Prisoner’s dilemma” is a concept in game
theory by which two actors could independently choose one of two actions, and
their payoffs are dependent upon the interaction between the choices each
makes. See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of
International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’LL.J. 139,
176²77 (1996). Translating this to the airline industry, Havel notes: “If a coun-
try unilaterally allows foreign ownership and control of its airlines, it risks
compromising the access of its airlines to international routes to other coun-
tries.” Havel, supra note 7, at 13203.
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benefits, and impediments of foreign ownership restrictions in
the airline industry.
B. The Origins of Foreign Ownership Restrictions
Foreign investment restrictions in the airline industry have
their origins in U.S. domestic law, not least because the United
States was a pioneer in the development of the aviation indus-
try. The U.S. Air Commerce Act of 1926 was the first law that
required U.S. air carriers to maintain 51 percent of their voting
stock under U.S. citizenship.
39
It also stipulated that 66 percent
of the members on the board of directors were to be U.S. citi-
zens.
40
The U.S. government has proffered four main reasons why it
has limited the ownership of its airlines to U.S. citizens: (1) the
need to protect the fledgling U.S. airline industry; (2) the desire
to regulate international air services through bilateral agree-
ments; (3) safety concerns about foreign aircraft gaining access
to U.S. airspace; and (4) military reliance on civilian airlines to
supplement airlift capacity.
41
Clearly, the U.S. Congress initi-
ated the citizenship requirement to ensure the availability of air-
craft for national defense purposes in 1925.
42
At the time, the
U.S. Congress and military planners believed that it was neces-
sary to have “government intervention in commercial air carrier
development for the dual purpose of training a reserve corps of
pilots and maintaining an auxiliary air force.”
43
Given that it
was in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the
country’s political and military leaders naturally inferred a close
association between the commercial and military roles of avia-
tion. Essentially, commercial pilots were potential military pi-
lots, and commercial aircraft represented a reserve air fleet in
the event of war.
44
39. See Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 73²74; Edwards, supra note 10, at
603; Gjerset, supra note 12, at 181²82; Nanda, supra note 12, at 363.
40. Id.
41. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION IMPACT OF
CHANGING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL LIMITS ON U.S. AIRLINES
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. AIRLINES, GAO/RCED-93-7, at 12²13 (1992),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/152884.pdf.
42. See Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 73.
43. Gjerset, supra note 12, at 180²81.
44. Nanda, supra note 12, at 379; Chang, et al., supra note 4, at 169; Brown,
supra note 12, at 1272; Bohmann, supra note 8, at 696; Lykotrafiti, supra note
8, at 664; Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 73.
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In the 1930s, the justification for the citizenship requirement
expanded from strict national security goals to those within the
domain of economics, namely protecting developing industries
from foreign competition.
45
Accordingly, the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 increased the ownership requirement of voting stock
by U.S. nationals from 51 percent to 75 percent for a carrier to
qualify as a U.S. operator.
46
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958
further narrowed the ownership restriction by specifically defin-
ing what a “citizen of the United States” meant.
47
This legisla-
tion was first amended by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
and these amendments were later codified in separate sections
of Title 49 of the U.S. Code, which continues to address the role
of transportation in the United States.
48
More fundamentally, when a state determines the desired
ownership profile of particular, or all, sectors of its economy, the
state naturally gives preferences to its own nationals.
49
Havel
and the aviation law expert, Gabriel Sanchez, have argued that
the right to exclude foreign investment has always been as much
a principle of sovereignty as the right to permit it.
50
Accordingly,
aviation has been one of the sectors for which foreign investment
45. Gjerset, supra note 12, at 182.
46. Edwards, supra note 10, at 603²04.
47. Id. at 609²10.
48. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (2006) provides:
[C]itizen of the United States” means³(A) an individ-
ual who is a citizen of the United States; (B) a partner-
ship each of whose partners is an individual who is a
citizen of the United States; or (C) a corporation or as-
sociation organized under the laws of the United States
or a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or
possession of the United States, of which the president
and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and
other managing officers are citizens of the United
States, which is under the actual control of citizens of
the United States, and in which at least 75 percent of
the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons
that are citizens of the United States.
Id.
49. BRIAN HAVEL & GABRIEL SANCHEZ, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW 131 (2014).
50. Id.
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is tightly regulated.
51
Also, as this article discusses later, the
United States has not only continued on a restrictive path re-
garding foreign investment in the airline sector, but its rules in
the area are also among the most constraining even from a com-
parative perspective.
52
If the United States has been the forerunner in domestic re-
strictions on foreign investment in its airline industry (i.e., in-
ternal lock), it also forged the first bilateral treatment in the
field (i.e., external lock). In 1946, the United States entered into
the first bilateral ASA, commonly referred to as Bermuda I, with
the United Kingdom.
53
Under Bermuda I, traffic rights could be
denied by either state if a carrier did not satisfy the SOEC re-
quirements as stipulated in the ASA.
54
Although Bermuda I pro-
vided amodel form for other bilateral ASAs, the agreement came
under considerable strain.
55
The UK withdrew from Bermuda I
in 1976, which led to another agreement between the two coun-
tries, known as Bermuda II.
56
Subsequently, since the early
1990s, the United States has been pursuing an “open skies” pol-
51. Although the foreign investment restriction started in the United
States, it is important to note that the U.S. airline industry has never been
nationalized. From the iconic airlines of the twentieth century, viz., Pan Amer-
ican Airways (commonly known as Pan Am) and Trans World Airlines (com-
monly known as TWA) to the current “Big 3” airlines, viz., Delta, United Air-
lines, and American Airlines, the U.S. airlines were never owned substantially
by the U.S. government. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil
Aeronautics Board ³ Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J.
91, 179 (1979); RESTORING OPEN SKIES: THE NEED TO ADDRESS SUBSIDIZED
COMPETITION FROM STATE-OWNED AIRLINES IN QATAR AND THE UAE 2 (Jan. 28,
2015), https://skift.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/White.Paper-2.pdf.
52. For detailed analyses of how the foreign ownership restrictions have
been interpreted by the U.S. regulatory authorities in specific cases, see
LELIEUR, supra note 2, at 31²40; Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 76²91; Nanda,
supra note 12, at 365²72; Bohmann, supra note 8, at 695²711; Gjerset, supra
note 12, at 186²92; HAVEL, supra note 11, at 138²62. A detailed discussion of
such interpretation by the U.S. authorities is beyond the scope of this paper.
53. Edwards, supra note 10, at 601; Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 75.
54. Edwards, supra note 10, at 601; Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 75;
Nanda, supra note 12, at 373; Bohmann, supra note 8, at 692²93; Lykotrafiti,
supra note 8, at 669²70.
55. Edwards, supra note 10, at 601; Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 75;
Nanda, supra note 12, at 373.
56. Id.
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icy with a view to a liberalized aviation sector through the crea-
tion of an open environment for international air travel.
57
De-
spite following an open policy in terms of granting liberalized air
traffic rights, the SOEC requirements in bilateral arrangements
have continued unabated.
58
In other words, while considerable
relaxations have been applied to the business front, tight re-
strictions have endured on the ownership front. These re-
strictions continue to inhibit foreign investments in the airline
sector.
C. The Expansion of Foreign Ownership Restrictions Around
the World
The “double-bolted locking mechanism” has expanded to other
countries around the world as well, albeit with subtle variations.
For example, in the European Union (EU), the SOEC require-
ments initially operated on a national basis, i.e. with reference
to each individual country.
59
Subsequent reforms have, however,
“marked the transition from nationally owned and controlled
airlines to community owned and controlled airlines.”
60
This has
resulted in a fully liberalized aviation market within the EU, as
it does away with nationality requirements across various EU
nations.
61
The SOEC requirements, however, apply in relation
to bilateral ASAs with other non-EU countries.
62
At the same
time, it is necessary to note that the evolution of the SOEC re-
quirements in Europe has been riddled with legal battles, which
have not been easy to resolve.
63
Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, most, if not all, states
have domestic laws that impose ownership restrictions in the
airline industry.
64
Table 1 shows the foreign ownership re-
strictions of selected Asia-Pacific countries.
57. Edwards, supra note 10, at 607; Nanda, supra note 12, at 374; Lyko-
trafiti, supra note 8, at 675²76.
58. Lykotrafiti, supra note 8, at 676.
59. Id. at 683.
60. Id. at 685.
61. Bohmann, supra note 8, at 718.
62. Chang, et al., supra note 4, at 165.
63. See, e.g., Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Kingdom of Den., 2002 E.C.R. 1-
09519.
64. Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways Decisions Be-
fore the Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra note 14, at 180.
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Table 1: Foreign Ownership Limits in Selected Asia-Pacific
Countries
65
Country
Maximum percent of foreign ownership
in selected countries
Australia
• 49 percent for international airlines
• 100 percent for domestic airlines
China • 49 percent
Hong Kong
• The only requirement for designation
as a Hong Kong carrier is that the car-
rier’s principal place of business be in
Hong Kong.
Indonesia • 49 percent
Japan • 49 percent
Korea • 49 percent
Malaysia
• 45 percent for Malaysia Airlines, but
the maximum holding by any single
foreign entity is 20 percent
• 49 percent for other airlines
New Zealand
• 49 percent for international airlines
• 100 percent for domestic airlines
Philippines • 40 percent
Singapore
• The only requirement for designation
as a Singapore carrier is that the car-
rier’s principal place of business be in
Singapore.
Taiwan • 49 percent
Thailand • 49 percent
Most states use the 51/49 model, that is, majority ownership
by local interest).
66
Hong Kong and Singapore are unique in that
they use principal place of business (PPB) as a replacement for
the traditional nationality rule that is based on ownership and
control.
67
In other words, the home state is allowed to designate
65. Adapted and updated from Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong
Kong Airways Decisions Before the Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra
note 14, at 181.
66. This has spawned the growth of joint ventures, particularly in the low-
cost carrier sector in Southeast Asia. See, e.g., infra note 69.
67. Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways Decisions Be-
fore the Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra note 14, at 182.
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a carrier whose PPB is within its territory despite the carrier’s
being wholly or partially owned by non-nationals of that state.
Despite the seemingly liberalized tenor of the PPB formula, how-
ever, there continues to be a great deal of uncertainty, as mat-
ters relating to management and control of the airline cannot be
eschewed altogether in this analysis.
68
Here, one finds it apposite to explain the boom of joint venture
airlines in Asia.
69
Due to the ownership and control restrictions,
foreign airlines cannot obtain majority ownership and control of
domestic carriers or set up new airlines or subsidiaries in a do-
mestic market.
70
Since the wholly-owned subsidiary strategy is
not legally permissible, airlines developed commercial ap-
proaches for circumventing ownership and control restrictions.
The establishment of joint ventures (JVs) with local interests is
a classic example of this.
71
In Asia, one can find this business model in the likes of
AirAsia, Lion Air, Jetstar, Spring Airlines, Tigerair, and Vietjet,
all of which have managed to establish a business presence in
jurisdictions outside their own through JV arrangements with
local investors.
72
In such cases, the JV airlines’ domestic equity
is owned by individuals or companies with or without prior busi-
ness experience in the airline industry.
73
In other instances,
Asian airlines have invested in companies where the local part-
ner is itself an airline.
74
68. This issue came to the fore in Hong Kong. See AIRTRANSPORTLICENSING
AUTHORITY, ATLA PUBLIC INQUIRY WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION FOR
LICENSE BY JETSTAR HONG KONG AIRWAYS LIMITED 40 (June 25, 2015) (H.K.),
http://www.thb.gov.hk/eng/boards/transport/air/Full%20written%20deci-
sion%20(Eng)%2025062015.pdf [hereinafter the ATLAPUBLIC INQUIRY], which
has been analyzed in Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways
Decisions Before the Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra note 14. See also
infra text accompanying notes 78²82.
69. For example, AirAsia owns a 49 percent stake in carriers in India, Thai-
land and Indonesia and 40 percent in the Philippines, although the question of
whether control of management remains with local hands is more contestable.
SeeWorld Economic Forum, supra note 1, at 11; Lee & Dy,Mitigating ¶Effective
Control’ Restriction on Joint Venture Airlines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia
Case, supra note 14.
70. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 651.
71. Lee & Dy,Mitigating ¶Effective Control’ Restriction on Joint Venture Air-
lines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia Case, supra note 14, at 238.
72. For a table listing out such JVs, see id. at 239²40.
73. Id.
74. For a table listing out such JVs, see id. at 243²44.
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If one considers JV airlines whose local shareholders are not
airline companies, an important question comes to mind: who
would really control the airline? In such cases, although each
foreign airline is only a minority shareholder, it is doubtful that
the local majority shareholders would really possess the
knowledge and capability to manage and control the airline,
which is a highly sophisticated business. Rather, it is likely that
such foreign carriers would have de facto control of the airline in
question.
75
Nonetheless, many local governments in Asia have
obviously relaxed effective control inquiries when they permit
JV airlines with local shareholders that are not airline compa-
nies.
76
Despite the general trend toward gradually relaxing effective
control restrictions, some governments have applied the effec-
tive control requirement more strictly, including those that have
migrated to the PPB approach.
77
Although the actual concept
that the ATLA applied was PPB based on Hong Kong’s Basic
Law,
78
the ruling very much involved interpreting “effective con-
trol.”
79
Because Hong Kong’s Basic Law does not set out any definition
of PPB, the ATLA cited relevant case law from other jurisdic-
tions.
80
The cases cited by the ATLA provided it with an opening
to link the concept of PPB with control. This, in turn, gave the
ATLA the ability to address its concern that airlines licensed in
Hong Kong should be actually controlled in Hong Kong as well.
81
In the decision, the ATLA set out the applicable test for deciding
75. JAE WOON LEE, REGIONAL LIBERALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT: TOWARDSNORTHEAST ASIANOPEN SKIES 187 (2016).
76. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (discussing the case of India).
77. The most prominent case is the Hong Kong Air Transport Licensing Au-
thority’s (ATLA) decision to reject Jetstar Hong Kong’s license application.
When Jetstar Hong Kong Airways (with proposed ownership apportioned in
the following manner: 51 percent ownership by Shun Tak Holdings, 24.5 per-
cent ownership by Qantas Airways, and 24.5 percent ownership by China East-
ern Airlines) applied for a license to operate scheduled air services, an objection
was raised by Hong Kong’s incumbent airlines, including Cathay Pacific Air-
ways Limited. SeeATLA PUBLIC INQUIRY, supra note 68.
78. ATLAPUBLIC INQUIRY, supra note 68. See also, Lee & Dy, A Commentary
on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways Decisions Before the Air Transport Licencing
Authority¸ supra note 14.
79. Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways Decisions Be-
fore the Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra note 14.
80. Id. at 188.
81. Id.
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whether an airline is able to satisfy the requirement. Highlights
of the requirement that the ATLA pronounced are as follows:
(i) The airline has to have independent control and manage-
ment in Hong Kong, free from directions or decisions made
elsewhere.
(ii) The nerve centre has to be in Hong Kong. By nerve centre,
the ATLA looks at where and by whom the decisions regarding
the key operations of an airline are made. Decisions are not
only those concerning day-to-day operations but also those
which are relevant and crucial to the business of the airline.
(iii) The core business of an airline is the carriage of passengers
and goods for reward, but the decisions as to where the airline
can fly (i.e. route and networking) and how much it can charge
for the services rendered (i.e. pricing) are two important fac-
tors, among others, also considered under the ATLA’s rubric.
Decisions pertaining to these matters must be independently
controlled and managed in Hong Kong.
82
Judging by the ATLA’s approach in the Jetstar case, there re-
mains some doubt about whether the PPB approach constitutes
much of a departure at all from the typical SOEC requirements.
Moving on, Australia and New Zealand have adopted a some-
what exceptional approach. Both these states have completely
liberalized foreign ownership of domestic airlines. As the first
country to do so, New Zealand removed the foreign ownership
restriction in 1988;
83
Australia relaxed the ownership rules in
1999.
84
This means that “any foreign person including a foreign
airline can acquire up to 100 percent of the equity of an Austral-
ian domestic airline.”
85
The lifting of the foreign ownership cap
was particularly significant in the creation of low-cost carriers.
86
Virgin Blue (now Virgin Australia), a subsidiary of the Virgin
Group, was established in 2000 with 100 percent U.K. capital,
82. ATLA PUBLIC INQUIRY, supra note 68.
83. See Chia-Jui Hsu & Yu-Chun Chang, The Influences of Airline Owner-
ship Rules on Aviation Policies and Carriers’ Strategies, 5 PROC. E. ASIA SOC’Y
TRANSP. STUD. 557, 565 (2005).
84. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 652; Bohmann, supra note 8, at 698;
Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways Decisions Before the
Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra note 14, at 182²83.
85. JEFFREY GOH, THE SINGLE AVIATION MARKET OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW
ZEALAND 72 (2001).
86. Hsu & Chang, supra note 83, at 566.
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and Tiger Airways Australia has been a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of Singapore’s Tiger Airways Holdings Limited since its cre-
ation in 2007.
87
In all, while there are countries like Australia and New Zea-
land, which have fully liberalized their domestic air segment,
and those like Hong Kong and Singapore that have adopted the
PPB model, most others continue to apply stringent regulations
that set forth nationality requirements for foreign investment in
the airline industry. Strict SOEC requirements are the norm ra-
ther than the exception. With a maximum limit of 25 percent
foreign investment, the United States continues to be one of the
most onerous regimes for foreign ownership in the airline indus-
try.
88
D. Proposals for Reform
Restrictive foreign ownership conditions around the world
have left the airline industry far behind in the path of liberali-
zation. Often, the SOEC requirements are ambiguous, leading
to substantial uncertainty for industry players.
89
The ambiguity
and uncertainty have the effect of conferring considerable dis-
cretion to national government authorities to interpret SOEC on
a case-by-case basis.
90
Moreover, although nearly a century has
elapsed since the origin of the SOEC requirements and the air-
line industry has come a long way, the regulatory developments
have failed to keep pace with reality. In these circumstances,
there have been considerable calls for reform of the SOEC re-
quirements, both within national legislation, as well as under
bilateral arrangements.
91
One set of proposals argues that the
time has come for a complete overhaul of the foreign investment
regime in the airline industry by obliterating ownership re-
strictions altogether.
92
This train of thought finds that safety
and security considerations can be addressed through other
mechanisms rather than through ownership restraints.
93
Havel
87. See Lee & Dy, A Commentary on Jetstar Hong Kong Airways Decisions
Before the Air Transport Licencing Authority¸ supra note 14, at 182.
88. Havel, supra note 7, at 13217.
89. LELIEUR, supra note 2, at 6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 151²54.
92. Id. at 151.
93. Id. At the same time, there have been strong protests against such an
approach and in favor of the status quo. Edwards, supra note 10.
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calls for a transition from the nationality rule to a norm that
considers “an ¶establishment,’ ¶strong link,’ or ¶corporate affin-
ity’”
94
of an airline toward a state. According to this approach,
the focus must be on the country that regulates various aspects
of an airline, including safety, security, environmental, taxation
and labor issues.
95
The focus is on regulatory connections to a
country as opposed to ownership linkages. As the CAPA Centre
for Aviation notes:
Regulatory nationality would refer to the state that oversees
the airline’s compliance with safety, labour and environmental
regulations; where the majority of its aircraft are registered,
and where it pays taxes. This would separate the nationality of
an airline as determined from a regulatory point of view from
the nationality of those owning its shares or making opera-
tional decisions.
96
Although this is similar to the PPB approach followed by Hong
Kong and Singapore, the regulatory nationality proposal is
somewhat narrower, and seeks to avoid the issues that arose in
the case of Jetstar Hong Kong.
97
The aforementioned proposal
has its limitations. While some states may be willing to relax or
remove their nationality restrictions under domestic law, the
ability to lift restraints under bilateral arrangements is more
difficult due to the external lock. Due to the prisoner’s dilemma,
states will be hesitant to make any concessions, and the only
way a major reform can be accomplished is if some of the leading
countries take the step to lift the foreign ownership re-
strictions.
98
Proposals have been made, however, for stopgap ar-
rangements through appropriate waivers of nationality require-
ments under bilateral treaties.
99
94. HAVEL, supra note 11, at 167.
95. World Economic Forum, supra note 1, at 15.
96. Airline Ownership and Control Rules: At Once Both Irrelevant and En-
during, CAPA: CENTRE AVIATION (June 5, 2017), https://centreforavi-
ation.com/insights/analysis/airline-ownership-and-control-rules-at-once-both-
irrelevant-and-enduring-345816.
97. Id. For a discussion on Jetstar Hong Kong, see supra text accompanying
notes 78²82.
98. HAVEL, supra note 11, at 165; Havel, supra note 7, at 13215. Both Aus-
tralia and New Zealand have already demonstrated a commitment in this re-
gard. See supra text accompanying notes 83²87.
99. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 662 (noting that a “novel ¶short path’
approach . . . contemplates that a state’s authorized government officials would
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In light of the origin, evolution, and diffusion of the ownership
restrictions in the airline industry³both through domestic reg-
ulation (internal lock) and bilateral arrangements (external
lock) as discussed in this Part³this article now embarks upon a
detailed examination of the legal regime in India.
II. INDIA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIME IN THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY
The foreign investment regime in India’s airline industry has
witnessed a checkered history. After shutting out any kind of
foreign investment altogether for several decades, it is only
about a quarter of a century ago that Indian airlines were per-
mitted to take on foreign ownership, but with stringent limits.
100
Since then, foreign investment rules have been considerably lib-
eralized, with the process picking up substantial momentum in
recent years, as this Part elaborates.
A. A Restrictive Regime Historically
Although private airlines were operating in India in the years
following its independence in 1947, the Indian government took
the step of nationalizing eight private airlines by enacting the
Air Corporation Act in 1953.
101
Since then, the Indian airline in-
dustry has constituted a state monopoly, with Air India operat-
ing on international routes and Indian Airlines in the domestic
sector.
102
It was only in 1994
103
that the state monopoly in the
airline industry was ended through the repeal of the Air Corpo-
declare publicly that they would no longer enforce the nationality clauses in
bilaterals with those states which agree reciprocally to do the same.”).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 103²05.
101. John F. O’Connell & GeorgeWilliams, Transformation of India’s Domes-
tic Airlines: A Case Study of Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, Air Sahara and Air
Deccan, 12 J. AIR TRANSP. MGT. 358, 360 (2006).
102. V.S. Mani & V. Balakista Reddy, The History and Development of Air
Law in India: A Survey, in AIR LAW& POLICY IN INDIA 23 (S. Bhatt, V.S. Mani
& V. Balakista Reddy eds., 1994). See also Alan Khee-Jin Tan, India’s Evolving
Policy on International Civil Aviation, 38 AIR&SPACE L. 439, 440 (2013).
103. This followed India’s economic liberalization in 1991. See Montek S.
Ahluwalia, Economic Reforms in India Since 1991: Has Gradualism Worked?,
in INDIA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION: THE POLITICS OF REFORMS 87 (Rahul
Mukherji ed., 2007); Anne O. Krueger & Sajjid Chinoy, The Indian Economy
in Global Context, in ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS AND THE INDIAN ECONOMY 21
(Anne O. Krueger ed., 2002).
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ration Act, which paved the way for the reentry of private play-
ers.
104
This development also coincided with the opening up, for
the very first time, of the Indian skies to foreign investment.
105
Under the 1994 policy, foreign direct investment (FDI) was per-
mitted up to 40 percent in Indian airline companies, although
the participation³direct or indirect³of foreign airlines was pro-
hibited altogether.
106
Moreover, the SOEC was to be vested with
Indian nationals, and the airline’s chairman, as well as two-
thirds of the directors, were to be citizens of India.
107
At the same
time, an important concession was made for nonresident Indians
(NRIs), who could now invest up to 100 percent in an Indian air-
line company.
108
Several private operators took advantage of the liberalization
of the airline industries by obtaining scheduled airline status
109
and commencing operations.
110
Of these, only Jet Airways con-
tinues to operate services to the present day; it has also been one
of the leading players on the Indian aviation scene.
111
Jet Air-
ways was granted the license to operate in 1993.
112
It was estab-
lished as an Indian company, which was owned by Tail Winds, a
company based in the Isle of Man.
113
In turn, Naresh Goyal, the
founder of the Jet Airways and an NRI, held 60 percent of the
shares of Tail Winds, while two foreign airlines, Gulf Air and
104. Hooper, supra note 18, at 116; Tan, supra note 102, at 440; Aviation
Sector: Policy Changes and Their Impact, HINDU BUS. LINE (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/aviation-sector-pol-
icy-changes-and-their-impact/article23029079.ece.
105. SHARAD KUMAR CHATURVEDI, FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT
ON LABOUR 75 (2007).
106. Id. at 75²76.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. A scheduled airline status allows an airline to operate according to pub-
lished schedules and fares, and must be contrasted with charter airlines. See
Gautam Gupta, Charter vs. Scheduled Airlines (Fall 2008) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with the Graduate Di-
vision, University of California, Berkeley), http://www.nex-
tor.org/pubs/GuptaDissertation2008.pdf.
110. These are Archana, Damania, East-West, Jet Airways, Modiluft and
NEPC Airlines. O’Connell & Williams, supra note 101, at 360.
111. Id. at 359.
112. Id. at 360.
113. Id. See also JETAIRWAYS (INDIA) LIMITED, PROSPECTUS 61 (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.cmlinks.com/pub/dp/dp5586.pdf [hereinafter the Jet Airways Pro-
spectus].
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Kuwait Airways, each held 20 percent.
114
The precarious nature
of India’s then-foreign investment policy in the airline industry
is reflected in a material revision the government made soon
thereafter in 1997, by which it decided to enforce the ban against
any investments by foreign airlines in Indian operators.
115
Con-
sequently, Gulf Air and Kuwait Airways divested their shares in
Tail Winds to Naresh Goyal, who became the sole owner of the
company and indirectly in control of Jet Airways. The ability of
NRIs to fully own Indian airline companies is an ongoing, pecu-
liar feature of foreign investment in the aviation industry, and
one that has been successfully utilized by companies, such as Jet
Airways.
116
The early 1990s also witnessed an attempt by Singapore Air-
lines to establish an airline in India as a joint venture with the
renowned Tata group.
117
Despite tireless efforts, the companies
failed to obtain the requisite license from the Ministry of Civil
Aviation due to too much existing capacity.
118
The aversion of
Indian regulators to the entry of foreign airlines through equity
investment in Indian companies dealt a fatal blow to the Singa-
pore Airlines-Tata venture, which failed to take off.
119
Commen-
tators have argued that the rejection of the Singapore Airlines-
Tata proposal was a result of “malignant lobbying”
120
by the ex-
isting private operators and by the state-owned Indian Air-
lines.
121
There is some evidence of the influence of domestic in-
terest groups in determining the shape of India’s foreign invest-
ment policy in the airline sector.
122
114. Id. at 61. It is a matter of some curiosity that the two foreign airlines
were permitted to invest in Jet Airways despite a policy pronouncement that
clearly barred foreign airlines from investing in the equity of an Indian com-
pany.
115. Id. O’Connell & Williams, supra note 101, at 360.
116. See infra Part III.D.1.
117. The Tata group is a leading industrial conglomerate headquartered in
India with operations around the globe. See Our Businesses: Tata Companies,
TATA, http://www.tata.com/company/index/Tata-companies (last visited Nov.
17, 2018). The Tata group has also enjoyed the distinction of being one of the
earliest players on the Indian aviation scene in the early part of the twentieth
century. See Hooper, supra note 18, at 115.
118. Hooper, supra note 18, at 117.
119. Id.
120. S.K. Saraswati, Operating Environment for a Civil Aviation Industry in
India, 7 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 127, 133 (2001).
121. Id. See also O’Connell & Williams, supra note 101, at 362²63.
122. See infra Part III.D.3.
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In the ensuing period, a restrictive legal regime began ad-
versely affecting the airline industry, which had a consequential
negative impact on India’s economy.
123
The Indian government
appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Naresh Chan-
dra, which recognized that due to the “highly capital intensive
nature of the airlines business, liberal norms for foreign invest-
ment is a critical pre-requisite for enhancing India’s airlines’ ac-
cess to international capital flows.”
124
Interestingly, the commit-
tee’s report sought to assuage concerns pertaining to national
security concerns in the airline industry, and acknowledged the
steps taken by other countries to liberalize foreign participation
in their airlines.
125
Accordingly, it recommended not only that
the foreign investment limit be raised from 40 percent to 49 per-
cent in India’s domestic and international airlines, but also that
foreign airlines be allowed to invest within the raised limit.
126
The committee’s recommendations were accepted, in part, in
2008 when the foreign investment limit was raised to 49 per-
cent,
127
but the doors continued to be shut for foreign airlines.
128
B. The Entry of Foreign Airlines
The year 2012 witnessed a momentous change. The Indian
government permitted foreign airlines to invest in Indian airline
companies to the extent of the prescribed limit of 49 percent.
129
There were, however, caveats stipulating stringent conditions
for investment by foreign airlines. Such investment could be
made only with the prior approval of the government, while non-
123. O’Connell & Williams, supra note 101, at 364.
124. MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON A ROADMAP
FOR THE CIVIL AVIATION SECTOR 26 (Nov. 30, 2003) (India), http://civilavi-
ation.gov.in/sites/default/files/moca_000740.pdf [hereinafter the Naresh Chan-
dra Report].
125. Id. at 26²27.
126. Id. at 27.
127. DIR. GEN. OF CIVIL AVIATION, GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE CIVIL AVIATION SECTOR (June 30, 2008) (India),
http://www.dgca.nic.in/aic/aic07_08.pdf; Press Note 4 of 2008, supra note 19.
128. Foreign airlines were permitted, however, to invest in cargo airlines. See
infra text accompanying notes 134²38. This period also saw mergers and ac-
quisitions activity in the airline industry. For example, in the private sector,
Air Sahara merged with Jet Airways and Air Deccan with Kingfisher Airlines;
in the public sector, Indian Airlines merged with Air India. See Tan, supra note
102, at 440²41.
129. Press Note 6 of 2012, supra note 20, ¶ 2.1.
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airline foreign investors could invest under the automatic route
without prior governmental approval.
130
An Indian airline re-
ceiving investment from a foreign airline would be granted a per-
mit to operate only if: (1) the Indian airline’s principal place of
business is in India; (2) the Indian airline’s chairman and at
least two-thirds of its directors are Indian citizens; and (3) the
SOEC is vested with Indian nationals.
131
Safety and security
concerns were also addressed, as foreign nationals seeking in-
volvement in the Indian airline’s business had to clear a security
review before deployment.
132
In addition, technical equipment to
be imported into India would also require appropriate clear-
ances.
133
Two additional features of the 2012 policy merit discussion.
The first is that foreign airlines were allowed to participate in
the equity of Indian cargo airlines, and a higher limit of 74 per-
cent was prescribed on the extent of such investments.
134
For in-
stance, Singapore Airlines could potentially set up a freighter
airline in India, subject to the limit prescribed above. Generally,
it has been easier to liberalize cargo service than passenger ser-
vice at a global level.
135
States have traditionally shown far more
willingness to provide market access for foreign carriers carry-
ing cargo than passengers.
136
For instance, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Single Aviation Market ap-
proach has demonstrated that the cargo market is more flexible
than the passenger market.
137
The reason why cargo liberaliza-
tion tends to be less controversial for states and their carriers is
130. Id. ¶ 2.2(i).
131. Id. ¶ 2.2(iv).
132. Id. ¶ 2.2(v).
133. Id. ¶ 2.2(vi).
134. Id. ¶ 3.
135. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Liberalization of Air Cargo Services, ¶
1.2, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/14 (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.icao.int/Meet-
ings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp014_en.pdf (noting that
“as at the end of October 2012, of the 400 plus open skies agreements concluded
by States, more than 100 granted Seventh freedom for air cargo or all cargo
services, thus providing greater opportunity for the growth of such services.”).
136. LEE, supra note 75 at 145.
137. IAN THOMAS, DAVID STONE, ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, ANDREW DRYSDALE, &
PHIL MCDERMOTT, DEVELOPING ASEAN’S SINGLE AVIATION MARKET AND
REGIONALAIRSERVICESARRANGEMENTSWITHDIALOGUEPARTNERS 72 (Final Re-
port, REPSF II Project No. 07/003 2008).
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that the participation of foreign carriers in freight transport can
help increase the exports of a particular state.
138
The second feature is that the state-owned airline, Air India,
was immunized against participation by foreign airlines because
the policy was inapplicable to it.
139
Presumably, this was in-
tended to shield the flag carrier. The reality, however, is that the
aviation community criticized this measure by calling it the “Air
India Syndrome” because the carrier was protected almost to
death, as it allowed other carriers to become more efficient.
140
The 2012 policy had an immediate impact on the airline indus-
try, as three foreign airlines capitalized on the opportunity to
invest in India. The first to get off the block was Abu Dhabi-
based Etihad Airways, which took a 24 percent stake in Jet Air-
ways.
141
This was followed by the establishment of two new joint
venture airlines. One involves a 49 percent stake by Singapore
Airlines in Vistara, in which the Indian partner, Tata Sons,
holds 51 percent.
142
The other is a 49 percent stake obtained by
AirAsia in AirAsia India, with the 49 percent of the remaining
stake currently held by Tata Sons and 2 percent of the stake held
by two Tata Sons executives.
143
This article subsequently dis-
cusses these airline investments in greater detail, with a view to
analyzing the impact of the policy.
144
138. Id.
139. Press Note 6 of 2012, supra note 20, ¶ 2.3.
140. Centre for Aviation, North Asian LCC, Round 1: Inertia Prevails Over
Innovation in 2013, 18 AIRLINE LEADER 36, 38 (Aug. 2013).
141. See NISHITH DESAI ASSOCS., JET-ETIHAD: JET GETS A CO-PILOT 1 (2014),
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Ma%20Lab/Jet-Eti-
had_Deal_Dissected.pdf.
142. Nirmala Ganapathy, Singapore Airlines’ New Indian Joint Venture
Vistara Unveils Services and Frills, STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014),
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/singapore-airlines-new-indian-
joint-venture-vistara-unveils-services-and-frills. Singapore Airlines’ second at-
tempt to foray into India was successful, after it had to withdraw its previous
proposal in the 1990s. See supra text accompanying notes 118²21.
143. P.R. Sanjai, Tata Sons to Buy Out Arun Bhatia from AirAsia India, LIVE
MINT (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.livemint.com/Compa-
nies/5GEBWmucXiPt5gbctu2DaL/Tata-Sons-to-increase-stake-in-AirAsia-In-
dia.html.
144. See infra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
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C. Recent Further Liberalization
The most recent round of liberalization occurred in 2016 in two
parts. In June of that year, the government of India further
opened up foreign investments in various sectors, including the
civil aviation sector.
145
The most drastic change is that foreign
investment in Indian airlines is permitted up to 100 percent.
146
Of this, 49 percent can be brought in under the automatic route,
while investment beyond that requires prior government per-
mission. While this may seem like complete liberalization of the
Indian airline sector to foreign investment, the increased limit
has been made unavailable to foreign airlines. In other words,
foreign airlines continue to be subject to the 49 percent cap on
investment coupled with the SOEC and security restrictions dis-
cussed earlier.
147
At the same time, foreign investment in cargo
airlines was fully opened up thereby allowing 100 percent par-
ticipation by foreign investors, including foreign airlines, and
thereby once again establishing the intent of the government to
put the cargo sector on a different pedestal from that of the pas-
senger sector.
148
That same month, the government of India, through the Min-
istry of Civil Aviation, issued the National Civil Aviation Policy
(NCAP) 2016 with a view not only to prescribe a comprehensive
regulatory policy governing the sector, but also to liberalize the
administrative and regulatory setup.
149
While the NCAP 2016
covers a wide range of issues relevant to the aviation sector in
general, this article confines its discussion to one important as-
pect that has direct relevance to the question of foreign invest-
ment. Since 2004, the government required that for Indian pri-
vate carriers to fly on international routes, they must have been
flying on domestic routes for five years andmust also have a fleet
of at least 20 aircraft; this is known as the “5/20 rule.”
150
Such a
145. Press Note 5 of 2016, supra note 21. The reforms brought about by the
press note are now subsumed into India’s foreign direct investment policy. See
DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY&PROMOTION, CONSOLIDATEDFDI POLICY 29 (2017) (In-
dia), http://dipp.nic.in/sites/de-
fault/files/CFPC_2017_FINAL_RELEASED_28.8.17.pdf [hereinafter Consoli-
dated FDI Policy].
146. Press Note 5 of 2016, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 129²33.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 134²38.
149. MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION, supra note 15.
150. Id.
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scheme, which was unique to India, was considered, however, an
impediment to new carriers, especially those such as Vistara and
AirAsia, which had only recently begun their operations.
151
At
the same time, the existing carriers who had already been sub-
ject to this rule only believed this to be fair, as they all had to
carry out domestic operations for five years before being allowed
to operate internationally.
152
After taking into account various
factors, the NCAP 2016 decided to do away with the five-year
requirement and provided that “all airlines can commence inter-
national operations provided that they deploy 20 aircraft or 20
percent of total capacity (in term[s] of average number of seats
on all departures put together), whichever is higher for domestic
operations.”
153
This will potentially allow the newly-minted In-
dian carriers with foreign investment, as well as those to be set
up in the future, to not only fly domestic routes, but to also ac-
celerate their international foray.
154
This policy arguably works
to incentivize foreign investment in Indian carriers, as they can
spread their business and risks through both domestic and in-
ternational operations.
In concluding this article’s discussion of the evolution of the
Indian legal regime governing foreign investments in the airline
industry, one finds that there has been a sea change in regula-
tion over the last quarter of a century. Since 1993, when only
two state-owned airlines³Air India and Indian Airlines³were
in operation, the airline industry has rapidly expanded and
grown to fourteen scheduled operators.
155
The national carrier,
151. See infra Parts III.A.2 and III.D.3.
152. Vaidyanathan, supra note 17, at 22; Neelam Mathews, India Adopts
Long-Awaited National Aviation Policy, AIN ONLINE (June 29, 2016),
http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2016-06-29/india-
adopts-long-awaited-national-aviation-policy.
153. MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION, supra note 15, ¶ 8(b).
154. This is subject to the airlines satisfying the requirements regarding the
minimum number of aircraft.
155. DIR. GEN. OF CIVIL AVIATION, LIST OF SCHEDULED OPERATORS, AS ON
20.07.2017 (2017) (India), http://www.dgca.nic.in/operator/sch-ind.htm.
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Air India, has only 13 percent of the market share of the indus-
try.
156
Several private carriers have demonstrated strong perfor-
mance,
157
while some have fallen by the wayside.
158
Ultimately,
the regulatory progression in India is a story of a transition from
a highly restrictive legal regime to one that is now liberal com-
pared to most other jurisdictions around the world.
With this background, this article now examines the prevalent
foreign investment policy in the Indian airline industry, with a
view to determining whether the benefits of foreign investment
are as strong as they have been portrayed to be.
III. NATIONALITY REQUIREMENTSUNDER INDIA’SDOMESTIC
LAW
This Part begins with a discussion of the internal bolt
159
that
sets out foreign investment restrictions under Indian domestic
law.
160
At the outset, India’s current policy on foreign investment
in the airline sector appears, from a comparative perspective, to
be rather open. While most countries have strict limits on the
level of foreign investment,
161
India has adopted a broad-minded
approach by allowing foreign investors that are not airline com-
panies to acquire total ownership and control of an Indian air-
line.
162
In doing so, it joins a select group of countries, such as
Australia and New Zealand, that allow 100 percent foreign in-
vestment in the industry.
163
In some ways, India’s approach is
even more liberal than Australia and New Zealand. While those
156. This figure is as of March 2017. Pravin Krishna & Vivek Dehejia, Pri-
vatize Air India, Now, LIVE MINT (May 29, 2017), https://www.live-
mint.com/Opinion/Y1PhhD4SiV2LRJemCETfeL/Privatize-Air-India-
now.html.
157. As the dominant player in the Indian domestic market, Indigo had a
market share of 41.4 percent in March 2017. FE Bureau, Air Traffic Soars 15%
in April; Indigo Stays on Top; Air India Marketshare Flat at 12.9%, FIN
EXPRESS (May 19, 2017), https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/air-traf-
fic-soars-15-in-april-indigo-stays-on-top-air-india-marketshare-flat-at-12-
9/675661/.
158. The most prominent airline among those who have suspended their op-
erations is Kingfisher Airlines. See Tan, supra note 102, at 441.
159. For a discussion of this concept, see supra text accompanying notes 30²
34.
160. For a discussion on the “external bolt,” see infra Part IV.
161. See supra Table 1.
162. Press Note 5 of 2016, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 84²87.
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two countries allow 100 percent foreign investment only in do-
mestic airlines (and no more than 49 percent in international
airlines), India makes no such distinction. In that sense, foreign
investors can invest up to 100 percent in an Indian airline that
operates internationally, thereby making it perhaps the most
liberal regime in the world.
164
India’s attitude is also comparable to the PPB approach
adopted by countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. In al-
lowing 100 percent foreign investment without any control con-
straints for non-airline investors, India has, in some ways,
demonstrated a bolder outlook, thereby avoiding some of the con-
trol- and management-related issues that cropped up in the
Jetstar case in Hong Kong.
165
The apparent liberalism of the Indian government ends there.
There are several factors that impose constraints on foreign in-
vestments in the airline industry in practice. First, India is the
only country in recent history that makes a distinction in its for-
eign investment policy on ownership and control between foreign
airline investors and non-airline investors.
166
While it displays a
flexible and receptive sentiment toward foreign non-airline in-
vestors, it has continued to impose shackles on foreign airline
investors. This is a significant impediment to foreign investment
in India’s airline industry. Second, in the case of non-airline in-
vestors, India’s policy signals an open invitation for foreign own-
ership up to 49 percent,
167
but it subjects investments beyond
164. See Tim Worstall, India’s Civil Aviation Industry Now To Be More Free
Than That In The United States, FORBES (June 20, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/06/20/indias-civil-aviation-in-
dustry-now-to-be-more-free-than-that-in-the-united-states/ (observing that
“the Indian civil aviation industry should now be more economically free than
that in the United States”). As this article will further discuss in the next part,
however, such international flights require a waiver from the partner states to
which the airlines operate based on the air services agreements.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 78²82.
166. For an earlier instance, the U.S. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 made it
unlawful for any foreign air carrier to acquire control in any manner whatso-
ever of any citizen of the United States substantially engaged in the business
of aeronautics, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(4) (1958), and a presumption of control ex-
isted where ownership exceeded 10 percent of the airline. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(f)
(1958). The authority of the Department of Transportation under 49 U.S.C. §
1378(a)(4) was terminated as of January 1, 1989. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(7) (1989).
See PAUL STEPHENDEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 599²600 (2008).
167. These investments are permitted under the automatic route (i.e. with-
out prior government approval).
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that limit to the requirement of obtaining prior government ap-
proval.
168
As of this writing, there is little, if any, clarity regard-
ing the circumstances under which such approval might be
granted and the conditions that the government is likely to im-
pose. This leaves a perplexing question: can the government, ex-
ercising its discretion in granting approvals beyond 49 percent
investment by foreign non-airline investors, reintroduce the
SOEC requirements through the back door? If so, the benefits of
liberalization in India’s policy may not be as extensive as they
appear.
This Part explores the implementation of India’s foreign in-
vestment policy, first to foreign airline investors, and thereafter
to non-airline investors. In doing so, it analyzes, by way of illus-
tration, some recent efforts by foreign investors to obtain share-
holdings in Indian airlines, as well as the issues that cropped up
during the process and the way they were resolved, either satis-
factorily or otherwise. This Part then considers some of the idio-
syncrasies of the Indian regime, such as a liberalized approach
toward NRI investments and the kid-glove treatment of Air In-
dia, and the role of lobbying in shaping foreign investment reg-
ulation in India’s airline industry.
A. Investments by Foreign Airlines
The SOEC requirements for investments by foreign airlines
are now encapsulated in India’s Consolidated FDI Policy.
169
Apart from stating that such investment is limited to a maxi-
mum of 49 percent of the paid-up capital
170
in the Indian opera-
tor, the material wording is as follows:
A Scheduled Operator’s Permit can be granted only to a com-
pany:
a) that is registered and has its principal place of business
within India;
b) the Chairman and at least two-thirds of the Directors of
which are citizens of India; and
168. Press Note 5 of 2016, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
169. See supra note 145.
170. Under Indian corporate law, “paid-up share capital” is defined to mean
the aggregate sum of money received as paid-up in respect of shares issued by
a company. Companies Act, 2013, § 2(64).
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c) the substantial ownership and effective control of which is
vested in Indian nationals.
171
As this Part elaborates, it is the third condition that has caused
a considerable level of consternation. Although the concepts of
substantial ownership and effective control in aviation are inter-
related, they have distinct characteristics. Substantial owner-
ship is a quantitative restriction that sets a limit on the amount
of a national carriers’ shares held by foreigners.
172
The limit of
49 percent is placed on the paid-up capital of the company.
Therefore, it does not matter whether the investment is in voting
shares or non-voting shares, the foreign airline’s overall share-
holding in the aggregate in the Indian company cannot exceed
49 percent. This may affect the capital raising ability of the In-
dian company even if it wishes to do so by issuing non-voting
shares to foreign airline investor.
173
The effective control restriction, on the other hand, is a quali-
tative criterion that focuses on who controls national air carri-
ers.
174
By its very nature, evaluating effective control is trickier
than assessing substantial ownership because it is not a mathe-
matical question. The Consolidated FDI Policy defines control to
“include the right to appoint a majority of the directors or to con-
trol the management or policy decisions including by virtue of
their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agree-
ments or voting agreements.”
175
Based on this definition, control
can be classified into two types.
176
The first is board control,
171. Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 145, ¶ 5.2.9.
172. Even though substantial ownership is seemingly a quantitative ques-
tion, reasonable minds can differ. Some argue that the concept involves holding
a majority of shares (say 51 percent), but others believe that in case of a com-
pany with a fragmented shareholding, even a 30 percent shareholding could
tantamount to substantial ownership. See Behind the Invisible Hand, BUS.
STANDARD (Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.business-standard.com/article/opin-
ion/behind-the-invisible-hand-116042400708_1.html.
173. Contrast this with the 25 percent limit available to foreign investments
into US airlines, where it is based on the amount of “voting stock.” This, too,
however, has been subject to varying interpretations by the US regulatory au-
thorities. See Alexandrakis, supra note 12, at 80²91; Nanda, supra note 12, at
365²72; Gjerset, supra note 12, at 190²92.
174. Lee & Dy,Mitigating ¶Effective Control’ Restriction on Joint Venture Air-
lines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia Case, supra note 14, at 234.
175. Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 145, ¶ 2.1.8.
176. See Umakanth Varottil, Comparative Takeover Regulation and the Con-
cept of ¶Control’, SING. J.L.S. 208, 218²21 (2015).
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which is more straightforward. The contractual documentation
between the parties must not give the foreign airline investor
the right to appoint a majority of the directors of the Indian com-
pany. The second is management, or operational, control, which
is thornier. This moves matters to a subjective domain that con-
fers considerable discretion to the regulatory authority to deter-
mine whether the foreign airline has management control. Man-
agement or operational control ultimately depends on the terms
of the contractual arrangements between the parties and has
given rise to ambiguities in the Indian context. These are best
understood through a brief discussion of the three foreign airline
investments that have been made in India since the policy was
liberalized in 2012.
1. Existing Airline: Jet Airways
Etihad Airways’ 2013 investment in a 24 percent stake in Jet
Airways represents a key milestone in the Indian aviation sec-
tor, as it was the first significant investment by a foreign airline
in an Indian one.
177
In spite of being a relative newcomer to the
industry, the Abu Dhabi based Etihad Airways has grown at a
scorching pace.
178
In a sector dominated by strong regional ri-
vals, such as Emirates and Qatar Airways, it was imperative for
Etihad to adopt a unique model, which was to focus on an inor-
ganic strategy through partnerships and equity investments in
other airlines.
179
Within a short span of time, Etihad entered
into numerous equity alliance arrangements with airlines across
several continents.
180
177. Nazneen Karmali, Etihad Buys Stake in India’s Jet Airways Amid Pro-
tests, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/naazneenkar-
mali/2013/04/25/etihad-buys-stake-in-indias-jet-airways-amid-pro-
tests/#3aee3fd537b9.
178. Our History: Overview, ETIHAD AIRWAYS, https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20130815214410/http://www.etihad.com:80/en-us/about-us/our-
story/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
179. Etihad: Flying Against Convention, ECONOMIST (June 28, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/business/2014/06/28/flying-against-convention.
180. Ivo Pezelj, Differentiation in Strategy Key to Etihad Airways’ Success,
ASPIREAVIATION (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.aspireaviation.com/2013/08/07/eti-
had-airways-equity-alliance-strategy/.
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A 24 percent investment in Jet Airways fit elegantly into Eti-
had’s strategy.
181
Etihad, Jet Airways, and the controlling share-
holders of Jet Airways entered into an appropriate shareholders’
agreement and a commercial co-operation agreement covering
matters, such as “administrative costs, sharing of joint re-
sources, better customer service and efficient administration of
their respective businesses.”
182
Etihad faced considerable diffi-
culties, however, as it navigated through the Indian regulatory
maze to obtain the various government approvals required for
the investment.
Under the policy governing foreign investment in the civil avi-
ation sector,
183
Etihad was required to obtain the permission of
the government of India. Applications were then considered by
an inter-ministerial body referred to as the Foreign Investment
Promotion Board (FIPB).
184
Even though Etihad was taking only
a 24 percent stake in Jet Airways, the FIPB raised concerns on
matters pertaining to the SOEC, particularly regarding the
board representation and management rights of Etihad.
185
Is-
sues arose as to whether Etihad was obtaining de facto control
of Jet Airways.
186
Such concerns were also echoed by other reg-
ulators that needed to clear the transaction, such as India’s se-
curities regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India,
and the competition regulator, the Competition Commission of
India.
187
To clear the hurdles imposed by the various regulators, Etihad
agreed to amend the provisions of the contractual agreements it
had with Jet Airways and its controlling shareholders to consid-
erably dilute the protective provisions.
188
Etihad was therefore
181. Etihad decided to take a 24 percent stake, rather than utilize the full
headroom of 49 percent, in order to avoid making a mandatory offer to buy the
shares of all the shareholders of Jet Airways, which would be triggered by an
acquisition of 25 percent or more. See Varottil, supra note 176, at 226.
182. NISHITHDESAI ASSOCS., supra note 141, at 2.
183. Press Note 6 of 2012, supra note 20.
184. For a brief background regarding the FIPB, see Umakanth Varottil,
Abolition of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board, INDIACORPLAW (Feb. 25,
2017), https://indiacorplaw.in/2017/02/abolition-of-foreign-investmen.html.
185. NISHITHDESAI ASSOCS., supra note 141, at 3.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 14²16.
188. Id.NISHITHDESAIASSOCS., supra note 141, at 2²4. See also Jet Airways,
Etihad Amend Shareholder Agreement, BUS. STANDARD (May 27, 2013),
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compelled to forsake some of its contractual and commercial pro-
tection in exchange for ensuring that the transaction would sail
smoothly through the Indian regulators.
189
In the end, Etihad
had to agree on watered down rights: (1) it settled for only two
board nominees out of a total of twelve directors with nomajority
board control; and (2) it had to give up any veto rights or affirm-
ative votes on key decisions involving the company.
190
Even though Etihad acquired only 24 percent shares in Jet
Airways, it endured an elongated process with the Indian au-
thorities that lasted more than a year before its investment
could be cleared.
191
In the process, Etihad had to relinquish the
customary rights available to minority shareholders to protect
their own interests.
192
It was also subjected to investigations by
multiple regulators³sometimes on repeated occasions³before
its investment was cleared.
193
Etihad was not even the largest
shareholder able to exercise any influence on its own, since the
controlling shareholders of Jet Airways held more than double
Etihad’s stake at 51 percent, thereby exercising legal control.
194
Etihad had to tread a fine line by clinically devising the con-
tractual arrangements and protections to withstand the Indian
regulators’ eagle eye. Although it ultimately succeeded in ob-
taining the regulatory clearances, the price it had to pay was
diminished protection and lost time and effort in convincingmul-
tiple regulators. The presence of zealous regulators with consid-
erable discretion to interpret control means, however, that par-
ties must be willing to alter their carefully negotiated contrac-
tual arrangements to meet the regulators’ concerns. In that
sense, regulatory discretion conferred through the SEOC re-
quirements penetrates the realm of contractual negotiation
when a foreign airline invests in an Indian one.
https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/jet-airways-etihad-
amend-shareholder-agreement-113052700025_1.html.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3²4.
191. Avantika Chilkoti, Jet Shares Wobble on Deal Delay, FIN. TIMES (June
17, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/5e5743c2-ca0d-3527-9287-
e0e23930addc.
192. See supra text accompanying note 188.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 183²87.
194. See Kenan Machado & Arirban Chowdhury, Jet Airways Founder to
Take Step for Etihad Deal, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 20, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887324103504578371770597009466.
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2. Newly-Established Airlines: AirAsia India and Vistara
The liberalization of 2012 also paved the way for two JV air-
lines in India: AirAsia India and Vistara.
195
Tata Sons, India’s
leading conglomerate holding company, has a stake in both air-
lines.
196
While AirAsia India is a low-cost carrier, Vistara is a
full-service carrier primarily targeting high-end business trav-
elers.
197
From the SOEC perspective, the change in the ownership
structure of AirAsia India is noteworthy. When AirAsia India
secured its Indian air operator certificate in 2013, the company
was a three-way joint venture between Tata Sons, businessman
Arun Bhatia’s Telestra Tradeplace Private Limited, which is an
Indian company, and AirAsia, with the partners holding 30 per-
cent, 21 percent, and 49 percent, respectively.
198
Interestingly,
Arun Bhatia had a close relationship with AirAsia’s founder and
group CEO, Tony Fernandes.
199
In June 2014, when AirAsia In-
dia commenced domestic services, AirAsia India’s ownership
changed, as Tata Sons’ shareholding increased to 41.06 percent,
Telestra Tradeplace’s holdings decreased to 9.94 percent, and
AirAsia’s ownership remained the same at 49 percent.
200
In
195. Unlike Jet Airways, the stocks of these companies are not publicly listed.
196. Sagar Malviya & Kala Vijayraghavan, Both Vistara and AirAsia in
Business to Fly High: Tatas, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), https://econom-
ictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/both-
vistara-and-airasia-in-business-to-fly-high-tatas/articleshow/55145804.cms.
197. Vistara, AirAsia India Look to Expand Fleet Size to 20 Planes as Rules
Eased, HINDUSTAN TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.hin-
dustantimes.com/business/vistara-airasia-india-look-to-expand-fleet-size-to-
20-planes-as-rules-eased-report/story-YPHidkmbfMCuuObMWrv63M.html.
198. AirAsia in Expansion Drive, HERALD (July 1, 2013), https://www.her-
ald.co.zw/airasia-in-expansion-drive/. A public interest challenge was mounted
in the Delhi High Court against AirAsia’s investment in AirAsia India on the
ground that the 2012 FDI policy in the civil aviation sector applied only to in-
vestments in existing airlines (i.e., brownfield projects) and not to investments
in newly established airlines (i.e., greenfield projects). At the interim stage, the
Delhi High Court refused to interfere as this was a policy question to be left to
the executive branch of the government to determine. The matter is, however,
pending final adjudication. See Swamy v. Union of India, (2014) 125 SCC 133
(Del.).
199. Who is Arun Bhatia?, BUS. STANDARD (Feb. 21, 2013), https://www.busi-
ness-standard.com/article/companies/who-is-arun-bhatia-
113022100028_1.html.
200. Sanjai, Tata Sons to Buy Out Arun Bhatia from AirAsia India, supra
note 143.
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March 2016, the media reported that Arun Bhatia was set to exit
AirAsia India after igniting a controversy through his remark
that AirAsia India was being controlled by its Malaysian part-
ner.
201
Consequently, Tata Sons bought a 7.94 percent stake
from Bhatia.
202
Two Tata Sons executives³AirAsia India chair-
man Subramaniam Ramadorai and director Ramachandran
Venkataramanan³acquired 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respec-
tively, from Bhatia in their personal capacity.
203
Ultimately,
AirAsia and Tata Sons each hold an equal stake of 49 percent,
with Ramadorai and Venkataramanan holding the remaining 2
percent shares in the aggregate.
204
Vistara’s background is less eventful than that of AirAsia In-
dia. From the beginning, Vistara’s ownership structure has been
a 51 percent ownership stake held by Tata Sons and a share-
holding of 49 percent by Singapore Airlines.
205
In fact, Tata
Sons’s joint venture was long-anticipated, originating in the In-
dian conglomerate’s unsuccessful attempts in the 1990s to
launch an airline in partnership with Singapore Airlines.
206
Un-
like AirAsia India, in which Tata Sons started off with a 30 per-
cent stake and minimal involvement in operations, Vistara was
seen as Tata Sons’ official reentry into the airline business after
a gap of over six decades.
207
201. Id. For the details of an interview by Arun Bhatia, see Binoy Prabhakar,
AirAsia India Controlled by Malaysian Partner Claims Cofounder Arun
Bhatia, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/in-
dustry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/airasia-india-controlled-by-malay-
sian-partner-claims-cofounder-arun-bhatia/articleshow/50129370.cms.
202. Sanjai, Tata Sons to Buy Out Arun Bhatia from AirAsia India, supra
note 143.
203. Id.
204. Tata Sons to Hold 49% Stake in AirAsia India; Arun Bhatia to Exit,
ECON. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/indus-
try/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/tata-sons-to-hold-49-stake-in-airasia-in-
dia-arun-bhatia-to-exit/articleshow/51587493.cms.
205. P.R. Sanjai, Tata-SIA’s Vistara Airline Gets India Operating Licence,
LIVE MINT (Dec. 26, 2014), https://www.livemint.com/Compa-
nies/BzczCiICRg68yhIecC3IBN/TataSIAs-Vistara-gets-India-operating-
licence.html.
206. Aneesh Phadnis,With Vistara, a Tata Airline Is Reborn, BUS. STANDARD
(Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/with-
vistara-a-tata-airline-is-reborn-115010800126_1.html. See also supra text ac-
companying notes 118²21.
207. Id.
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India’s incumbent airlines, however, have accused AirAsia In-
dia and Vistara of being controlled by foreigners and have asked
for their operating licenses to be suspended.
208
In response to
this allegation, the Tata group has argued:
Majority ownership and effective control of both airlines are
with the Indian parties. . . . Further, all the important decisions
concerning the day-to-day operations of the airlines are taken
by the management teams of these airlines under the overall
supervision, control and direction of the respective boards of
directors (which include a majority of Indian nationals).
209
Although the controversy is unabated and a lawsuit,
210
whose
outcome is difficult to predict, is in progress,
211
the Jetstar Hong
Kong decision can be an important lesson for India. The fact that
the conduct of day-to-day management takes place in India is
not enough to meet the control criteria. What is more, the terms
and tenor of contractual arrangements, such as the sharehold-
ers’ agreement and any business service agreement, could be im-
portant considerations. To be clear, each shareholders’ agree-
ment must establish that the Indian airlines, AirAsia India and
Vistara, can make their decisions independently from the for-
eign airline shareholders. Similarly, any business service agree-
ments or commercial co-operation agreements must show that
AirAsia India and Vistara have the right to determine their own
network, fare structure, and other flight-related matters.
The experiences borne out by investments by foreign airlines
is far from satisfactory. The SOEC restrictions have been de-
signed and applied in an ambiguous manner, and uncertainties
remain. While the opening of the Indian civil aviation sector in
208. Tarun Shukla, India’s Airlines Team to Try to Block AirAsia Low Cost
Carrier, SKIFT (Feb. 22, 2014), https://skift.com/2014/02/22/indias-airlines-
team-to-try-to-block-airasia-low-cost-carrier/.
209. Statement by Tata Sons on Civil Aviation, TATA (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.tata.com/media/releasesinside/statement-tata-sons-civil-aviation.
See also Arindam Majumder, Tata Sons Says It Effectively Controls Vistara,
AirAsia, BUS. STANDARD (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.business-stand-
ard.com/article/companies/tata-sons-says-it-effectively-controls-vistara-
airasia-116022500044_1.html.
210. See supra note 198.
211. Swamy v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 5909/2013 (Del.). The status of the
case as of October 25, 2018 is available at http://delhihigh-
court.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=234698&yr=2018.
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2012 to foreign airlines was a momentous occasion in the indus-
try’s evolution, the regulatory regime still leaves much to be de-
sired.
B. Non-Airline Investors
India has fully liberalized foreign investments by non-airline
investors in its civil aviation industry by allowing 100 percent
foreign ownership. This is beneficial to the Indian airline indus-
try as it allows Indian carriers to raise capital to meet their busi-
ness needs in a highly competitive environment.
212
It also ena-
bles Indian airline companies to undertake initial public offer-
ings on domestic or international stock exchanges, with a view
to accommodating foreign investment without quantitative lim-
itations.
213
While, at one level, this approach looks beneficial in
attracting foreign investment, there appear to be several hurdles
in its implementation.
At the outset, the liberalization seems to have been under-
taken in a piecemeal manner. The Consolidated FDI Policy
214
that deals with foreign investments allows 100 percent foreign
ownership in the sector without any apparent SOEC restrictions
on non-airlines investors.
215
The requirements stipulated by the
Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), however, have failed
212. P.R. Sanjai, What Does 100% FDI in Aviation Mean?, LIVE MINT (June
21, 2016), https://www.livemint.com/Poli-
tics/qXiX9p9ViAPzupDjqsnlWN/What-does-100-FDI-in-aviation-mean.html.
213. Id. On a related note, several Indian airline companies, including Jet
Airways India Limited, SpiceJet Limited and, most recently, InterGlobe Avia-
tion Limited (which operates Indigo), have approached the capital markets in
the past. See Ravindra N. Sonavane, Aviation Stocks Rally on Robust Passen-
ger Growth, LIVE MINT (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.live-
mint.com/Money/81cv6H6wbkMsaOzRQJODYL/Aviation-stocks-rally-on-ro-
bust-passenger-growth.html.
214. Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 145, ¶ 5.2.9.2.
215. The conditions relating to SOEC apply only to foreign airline investors.
See Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 145, ¶ 5.2.9.2, under the heading
“Other Conditions,” at sub-para. (c). See also Sindhu Bhattacharya, Reasons
Why 100% FDI in India’s Civil Aviation Could Fail to Take Off, FIRSTPOST
(June 23, 2016), https://www.firstpost.com/business/reasons-why-100-fdi-in-
indias-civil-aviation-could-fail-to-take-off-2852118.html; PTI, Government
Working on ¶Appropriate Policies’ for 100% FDI in Airline, ECON. TIMES (Mar.
15, 2017), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/govern-
ment-working-on-appropriate-policies-for-100-fdi-in-airline/arti-
cleshow/57655297.cms.
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to keep pace with the liberalization in foreign investment.
216
The
requirements imposed by the DCGA for grant of a permit to op-
erate scheduled air transport services continue to carry the con-
dition that, in the case of an Indian airline seeking the permit,
“substantial ownership and effective control is vested in Indian
nationals.”
217
The Consolidated FDI Policy and the DGCA re-
quirements are mutually contradictory. The interaction of the
legal regimes governing foreign investment and the aviation sec-
tor results in an inconceivable situation where an airline may
have 100 percent foreign investment, but nevertheless, substan-
tial ownership and effective control need to be vested in Indian
hands. Unless the regulations imposed by the DGCA are re-
formed, investments by non-airline investors that exceed 49 per-
cent or confer SOEC on such foreign shareholders will remain a
fanciful hope.
Moreover, foreign investments beyond 49 percent require the
approval of the government of India, which will be granted on a
case-by-case basis.
218
Yet, there are no signs of how the govern-
ment will exercise its discretion in considering the applications
for majority foreign investment in Indian airlines.
219
More im-
portantly, the government always has the prerogative to intro-
duce the SOEC requirements by way of conditions while grant-
ing the approvals for foreign ownership beyond 49 percent, alt-
hough such SOEC requirements are not evident from the rele-
vant text of the FDI Policy Circular that applies to non-airline
216. See infra text accompanying notes 217²22.
217. DIR. GEN. OF CIVIL AVIATION, MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANT OF
PERMIT TO OPERATE SCHEDULED PASSENGER AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES ¶
3.1(b)(iii) (Mar. 1, 1994) (India), http://www.dgca.nic.in/operator/aop-ind.htm.
218. Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 145, ¶ 5.2.9.2(1)(a).
219. Hitherto, government approvals for foreign investment were considered
and granted by the FIPB, an inter-ministerial body. See supra note 184. In
2017, however, the government abolished the FIPB, and announced the stand-
ard operating procedures by which foreign investment applications will be con-
sidered by the relevant ministries or sectoral regulators. DEP’T OF INDUS.
POLICY AND PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUS., STANDARD
OPERATINGPROCEDURES (SOP) FORPROCESSINGFDIPROPOSALS (June 29, 2017)
(India), http://dipp.nic.in/whats-new/standard-operating-procedure-sop-pro-
cessing-fdi-proposals. Until considerable experience and proper practices have
developed under these newly-minted reforms, however, there are likely to be
difficulties in their implementation. See Prem Rajani & Poorvi Sanjanawala,
Will Abolishing FIPB Make India a More Investor-Friendly Destination?,
VCCIRCLE (June 8, 2017), https://www.vccircle.com/will-abolishing-fipb-make-
india-a-more-investor-friendly-destination/.
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investors. In other words, there is a risk that the government
might not adopt a hands-off approach to foreign investment by
non-airline investors, and might use its discretion to curb the
ownership and control rights that they might exercise.
220
At a
broad level, the policy pronouncement undoubtedly makes In-
dia’s foreign investment regime in the airline sector fully open;
however, matters are not likely to be as straightforward when
the policy is applied, especially when non-airline investors seek
to obtain more than a 49 percent share ownership in Indian com-
panies. Moreover, this issue remains untested as, to the authors’
knowledge, no foreign investor has made an application to the
government for foreign investment beyond 49 percent in an In-
dian airline.
221
It is also unlikely that India’s airline sector will
witness a foreign investor taking a substantial stake in an In-
dian company soon.
222
Even as the dust settles on the new policy reforms allowing
foreign investments up to 100 percent in Indian airlines, an an-
nouncement by Qatar Airways to set up an airline in India has
stirred up a hornet’s nest. Since Qatar Airways itself cannot ac-
quire more than a 49 percent share in an Indian airline³and
that it will be subject to the SOEC requirements³it has report-
edly considered partnering with Qatar Investment Authority,
the country’s sovereign wealth fund.
223
To begin with, Qatar’s
proposal sounds rather attractive. The airline’s investment will
be confined to the 49 percent allowed under the law, with the
sovereign wealth fund taking the remaining stake,
224
such that
the Indian airline can be owned entirely by the two Qatari enti-
ties.
225
There is more to it, however, than meets the eye. First,
the Consolidated FDI Policy is unclear about whether the 100
percent limit for foreign investment applies only when there is
no participation by a foreign airline, or whether it is possible for
a foreign airline to partner with a non-airline investor³as in the
220. Bhattacharya, supra note 215 (noting that “any non-airline foreign in-
vestor may have to undergo minute scrutiny from government agencies for per-
mission to bring in funds into an Indian carrier”).
221. PTI, supra note 215.
222. Sanjai, What Does 100% FDI in Aviation Mean?, supra note 212.
223. FC Bureau, Qatar Airways Confident of Clearing FDI Hurdles in India,
FIN. CHRONICLE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.mydigitalfc.com/my-world/qatar-
airways-confident-clearing-fdi-hurdles-india.
224. This would of course have to be with the Indian government’s approval.
225. FC Bureau, supra note 223.
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Qatar case³to fully exploit the rules. Somemight argue that the
100 percent limit applies only when there is no involvement by
a foreign airline in the proposed transaction.
226
Second, even if
the policy were to be interpreted expansively to allow such a
partnership, it would be imprudent to expect that the govern-
ment of India would approve such an investment, given that it
might be viewed as circumventing the SOEC requirements ap-
plicable to foreign airlines.
227
For the reasons discussed above, foreign non-airline investors
face numerous hurdles in obtaining a significant majority stake
in Indian airline companies. After separately analyzing invest-
ments by foreign airlines on the one hand, and those by non-air-
line investors on the other, this article now aims to account for
the unique distinction that the Indian foreign investment policy
makes regarding ownership by these two types of investors and
to consider whether such differentiation is worthy of merit.
C. Reviewing the Dichotomy between Airline and Non-Airline
Investors
The regulatory regime in India is unique in that the foreign
investment norms draw a line embodied by the SOEC require-
ments to distinguish between foreign airlines and non-airline in-
vestors.
228
A detailed rationale for such a distinction has eluded
the public domain.
229
On the surface, it appears to be a neat dis-
tinction. The exercise of control by foreign airlines might argua-
bly affect the safety and security concerns and increase any eco-
nomic threat to the Indian airline sector.
230
As this article has
226. ERNST & YOUNG, EY INDIA CIVIL AVIATION: EY’S POINT OF VIEW ON
AMENDEDFOREIGNDIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) POLICY ONCIVILAVIATIONSECTOR
Q.6 (June 24, 2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Civil_Avia-
tion_Sector.pdf/$FILE/Civil_Aviation_Sector.pdf.
227. FC Bureau, supra note 223 (quoting the Aviation Secretary as saying:
“We would like to see there is no connection, direct or indirect between a for-
eign airline and its co-partner investing beyond the 49 per cent stake in an
Indian carrier. . . .”).
228. SeeWorld Economic Forum, supra note 1, at 12.
229. Steven Philip Warner, How the IndiGo IPO Leads Us to the Question of
¶Right’ Foreign Investments in the Aviation Industry, DOLLAR BUS. (May 29,
2015), https://www.thedollarbusiness.com/news/how-the-indigo-ipo-leads-us-
to-the-question-of-right-foreign-investments-in-the-aviation-industry/22755.
230. For a discussion of such rationale in the U.S. context, see supra text
accompanying notes 41²44.
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already highlighted earlier in this part, however, this distinction
gives rise to several problems in its practical implementation.
While foreign airlines are likely to be strategic investors, non-
airline owners are largely likely to be financial investors.
231
To
that extent, foreign airlines can seek to benefit substantially
from their investments only if they have other forms of partner-
ship with the Indian airline and possess the capability to partic-
ipate in at least some of the key strategic decisions of the com-
pany.
232
In the case of investments by foreign airlines, much
would depend upon the identity of the Indian controllers, who
possess SOEC. If the local partner is an established company or
group in the airline industry, the investor that is a foreign air-
line may be more willing to cede full control over the operations
of the Indian airline to the local partner.
233
When the Indian
partner does not have prior experience in the airline sector, how-
ever, matters become somewhat murkier.
234
In such cases, it is
likely that the foreign airline investor would seek to exercise a
greater say, at least on key decisions, in order to protect its in-
vestment in the company.
235
One of the authors has argued that
foreign airline investors may, in fact, prefer such a scenario
231. See Amy Kazmin & James Crabtree, AirAsia and Tata to Set Up Indian
Airline, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/73924dee-7b54-
11e2-8eed-00144feabdc0. For a comparison more generally between strategic
and financial investors, see Stefan Arping & Sonia Falconieri, Strategic Versus
Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting,
62 OXFORDECON. PAPERS 691 (2010).
232. ET Bureau, Jet Airways, Etihad Deal Will Be Deep Strategic Alliance:
Aviation Experts, ECON. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2012), https://economictimes.indi-
atimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/jet-airways-etihad-
deal-will-be-deep-strategic-alliance-aviation-experts/arti-
cleshow/17366082.cms.
233. See Lee & Dy,Mitigating ¶Effective Control’ Restriction on Joint Venture
Airlines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia Case, supra note 14, at 241²44. Even in
such a scenario, however, foreign airline investors would like to retain as much
control as is legally permissible, in order to fully exploit the commercial bene-
fits of the investment in the Indian airline from a business perspective. This
explains the detailed rights initially sought by Etihad in its investment in Jet
Airways, although it had to subsequently water them down to pass muster un-
der the Indian foreign investment regulations. See supra text accompanying
notes 188²90.
234. See Rhik Kundu, Effective Control of AirAsia India Was With Parent,
Shows Brand Licence Pact, LIVE MINT (June 1, 2018), https://www.live-
mint.com/Companies/bJghd3euHwnx340wkJqS6H/Effective-control-of-
AirAsia-India-was-with-Malaysian-parent.html.
235. Id.
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where there is only one specialist partner, as differences over
managerial or operational matters may be difficult to reconcile
between two airline partners.
236
A partnership between a foreign
airline and a non-airline Indian controlling shareholder, how-
ever, might result in a situation where the foreign airline may
be deemed to possess de facto control.
237
This is arguably not an
appropriate scenario when the only partner in the arrangement
that has airline expertise is restrained from contributing such
expertise to the full extent due to regulatory compulsions. Such
a scenario results in consolidating all powers of control in the
hands of a non-specialist Indian partner. Surely, this cannot be
desirable from the perspective of fully utilizing management
skills and enhancing business efficiency.
Moving to foreign ownership by non-airline investors, there
are thorny issues within that realm as well. Such investors are
principally expected to invest with a view to obtaining financial
returns, rather than to exercise control over the management
and policy of the Indian airline.
238
Such investors may purchase
a stake through a public offering or private placement of shares
by a company that may have capital needs. While such investors
are potentially entitled to exercise control,
239
it might very well
be that they are uninterested. There is, however, a greater like-
lihood of a financial investor partnering with a foreign airline,
which tips the scale toward the other side of the divide, with the
entire transaction being colored by the presence of the foreign
airline. This would invoke the SOEC requirements.
240
For these reasons, it remains to be seen whether the two-part
legal regime³for example, one governing foreign airlines as in-
vestors and the other concerning non-airline investors³will be
beneficial for the Indian aviation sector, or whether such a clas-
sification is likely to result in unintended consequences.
236. Lee & Dy,Mitigating ¶Effective Control’ Restriction on Joint Venture Air-
lines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia Case, supra note 14, at 241.
237. Id.
238. See Amy Kazmin & Simon Mundy, Is India Really the Most Open Econ-
omy for FDI?, FIN. TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/bac-
dacee-3780-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f.
239. This is possible because the Consolidated FDI Policy does not impose
SOEC requirements on them. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
240. The discussion surrounding the potential entry of Qatar Airways into
the Indian aviation scene epitomizes this point. See supra text accompanying
notes 223²27.
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After a discussion of the principal issues governing foreign in-
vestment in the Indian airline industry, this article now touches
upon other quirks of the regulatory regime, as well as the mar-
kets in the Indian financial sector that have a role to play in the
shaping and implementation of foreign investment norms.
D. Some Twists in India’s Aviation Tale
Law and economics theorists have sought to analyze the role
of the aviation industry in shaping government regulation. The-
ories, such as “interest group politics”
241
and the “regulatory cap-
ture theory,”
242
have focused on the influence of industry in
molding the regulations that govern it.
243
These theories have
been attributed to the way in which regulation of the aviation
industry, too, has evolved, particularly in the United States.
244
Often, the interest groups interact in rather complex ways with
the government authorities, and as a consequence, discernible
trends may not always emerge.
Applying this theory, one finds that Indian regulation in the
civil aviation sector has also been subject to influence from var-
ious interest groups, either overtly or with a dose of subtlety.
245
Three groups, all of which are incumbents in the Indian airline
sector, are worth exploring. They are: (1) the NRI community,
241. The theory of interest group politics focuses on the role that various in-
terest groups play in the creation of law or public policy. See Jean-Jacques Laf-
font & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991).
242. Similar to interest group politics, the regulatory capture theory postu-
lates that “regulation is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups
struggling among themselves to maximize the incomes of their members.”
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 335²
36 (1974).
243. Id.
244. See ELDAD BEN-YOSEF, THE EVOLUTION OF THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY:
THEORY, STRATEGY AND POLICY 141²42 (2005); STEVEN TRUXAL, COMPETITION
AND REGULATION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: PUPPETS IN CHAOS 50²52 (2012);
Maja Andlovic & Wilhelm Lehmann, Interest Group Influence and Interinsti-
tutional Power Allocation in Early Second-Reading Agreements: A Re-Exami-
nation of Aviation Emissions Trading, 21 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 802 (2014).
245. See, e.g., VIJAY VIR SINGH & SIDDHARTHA MITRA, REGULATORY
MANAGEMENT AND REFORM IN INDIA: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR OECD (2008),
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44925979.pdf; Rahul Mukherji &
Gaurav Kankanhalli, Civil Aviation in India: An Exploration in the Political
Economy of Promoting Competition (ISAS Working Paper No. 97, Nov. 18,
2009), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/109847/96.pdf.
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which has received preferential treatment all along with respect
to foreign investment;
246
(2) the state-owned Air India, which en-
joyed a monopoly for nearly half a century; and (3) the Federa-
tion of Indian Airlines, a lobby group comprised of incumbents
that has sought to keep the barriers high to restrict new en-
trants into the Indian airline industry.
1. Investments by NRIs
Ever since private airlines became operational in India in the
1990s, NRIs have received preferential treatment because they
have been allowed to invest up to 100 percent shareholder own-
ership in an Indian airline.
247
This puts them at a significant
advantage over other foreign investors. Although the definition
of who constitutes an NRI, as well as some of the rules surround-
ing that, have changed over time, an NRI is currently defined to
mean either an Indian citizen who is a resident outside India or
is an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI).
248
Historically, some leading Indian private airlines have been
established through the NRI route. The most significant exam-
ple is that of Jet Airways, which was completely owned by Tail
Winds, a company in turn wholly owned by Naresh Goyal, who
is an NRI.
249
Tail Winds transferred its shares to Goyal.
250
Fol-
lowing the company’s initial public offering and investment by
Etihad Airways,
251
Goyal now holds a 51 percent share,
252
and
246. See supra text accompanying note 108.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 108²16.
248. Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 145, ¶ 2.1.32. An OCI is defined
under section 7A of the Citizenship Act of 1955 to include persons who are of
Indian origin and who have been issued an OCI card by the Government of
India. An OCI includes a person whose parent or grandparent is or was a citi-
zen of India.
249. See also supra text accompanying notes 110²15.
250. This transfer was accomplished in tranches in 2013. See NISHITHDESAI
ASSOCS., supra note 141, at 5²6; Aneesh Phadnis, Change in Jet Airways Own-
ership as Tail Winds Transfers Shares to Naresh Goyal, BUS. STANDARD (May
23, 2013), https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/change-in-
jet-airways-ownership-as-tail-winds-transfers-shares-to-naresh-goyal-
113052300995_1.html.
251. For a detailed discussion of Etihad’s investment in Jet Airways, see su-
pra Part III.A.1.
252. Shareholding Patterns, NAT’L STOCK EXCHANGE INDIA,
https://www.nseindia.com/corporates/corporateHome.html?id=spatterns (last
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thereby meets SOEC requirements. Similarly, there is evidence
of NRI investments in InterGlobe Aviation Limited, the com-
pany that runs Indigo Airlines.
253
One of its founders, Rakesh
Gangwal, is an NRI based in the United States,
254
and continues
to own a significant number of shares in the company.
255
The NRI investment structure has come under some attack as
not only being incumbent-friendly, but also as being non-trans-
parent. Critics have argued that the NRI structure can be used
to mask the real shareholding structure of the company.
256
The
newer entrants to the Indian aviation sector have argued that
the NRI route discriminates against foreign airline investors.
257
While NRIs can enjoy massive benefits under India’s regulatory
regime even though they are residents outside of India, other
types of foreign investors, especially foreign airlines, are subject
to strict SOEC restrictions. Such an incumbent-friendly policy
has come under significant attack from Tony Fernandes, the
AirAsia boss, who has ridiculed the situation under which lead-
ing Indian airlines have been controlled by NRIs.
258
Fernandes
visited Nov. 17, 2018) (see the shareholding pattern of Jet Airways (India) Lim-
ited as on June 30, 2017). Goyal’s shareholding is shown under the category
“Individuals (Non-Resident Individuals/ Foreign Individuals).” Id.
253. ET Bureau, FIPB Approves Proposal to Convert Rakesh Gangwal’s In-
diGo Stake to NRI Category, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2014), https://econom-
ictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/fipb-ap-
proves-proposal-to-convert-rakesh-gangwals-indigo-stake-to-nri-category/arti-
cleshow/39427443.cms.
254. Air Asia Boss Tweet Adds to Aviation Row, BUS. STANDARD (Feb. 27,
2016), https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/air-asia-
boss-tweet-adds-to-aviation-row-116022700547_1.html.
255. Shareholding Patterns, supra note 252 (see the shareholding patterns of
INDIGO InterGlobe Aviation Limited as on June 30, 2017). Gangwal’s share-
holding is shown under the category “Individuals (Non-Resident Individuals/
Foreign Individuals).” Id.
256. Subramanian Swamy Says First Find Out Real Owners of Jet Airways,
MONEYLIFE (July 29, 2013), https://www.moneylife.in/article/subramanian-
swamy-says-first-find-out-real-owners-of-jet-airways/33857.html.
257. Anirban Chowdhury, AirAsia Berhad CEO Tony Fernandes Applies for
¶Overseas Citizen of India’ Status, ECON. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), https://econom-
ictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/airasia-
berhad-ceo-tony-fernandes-applies-for-overseas-citizen-of-india-status/arti-
cleshow/51424163.cms.
258. Air Asia Boss Tweet Adds to Aviation Row, supra note 254; P.R. Sanjai,
Are Owners of Airlines Living in India, Asks AirAsia’s Tony Fernandes, LIVE
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has responded not only through words, but also through his ac-
tions.
259
He himself applied for and obtained NRI status relying
upon the fact that his father was of Indian origin.
260
The tone of
his press statements indicate that such a move is to retaliate
against the accusations of incumbent Indian airlines that have
alleged that the SOEC relating to AirAsia vests with its foreign
owners rather than the Indian partners.
261
It is not entirely
clear, however, whether this confers any legal advantage on Fer-
nandes. He may encounter legal hurdles if he seeks to obtain
shares in AirAsia India in addition to the 49 percent of shares
already held by the AirAsia parent company.
262
Whether the
NRI route can be exploited when the NRI invests along with a
foreign airline is not a question that the Indian authorities have
been called upon to deal with under the current regime.
263
The
NRI route remains an oddity among the Indian legal regime’s
governance of foreign investments in the airline sector and has
continued to create a few ripples in the industry.
2. Incumbency of the State-Owned Behemoth
Historically, the privatization of state-owned carriers has been
a politically sensitive topic, and it is understandable that coun-
tries established ownership and control restrictions for foreign
MINT (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.livemint.com/Compa-
nies/k8VOnartdbK43Cxf2NHBCI/Are-owners-of-airlines-living-in-India-
AirAsias-Tony-Fern.html.
259. Chowdhury, supra note 257.
260. Id. Shahkar Abidi, AirAsia Chief Gets Overseas Citizenship of India
Card Ahead of New Civil Aviation Policy, DNA INDIA (June 13, 2016),
https://www.dnaindia.com/business/report-airasia-chief-gets-overseas-citizen-
ship-of-india-card-ahead-of-new-civil-aviation-policy-2222997.
261. See Abidi, supra note 260.
262. The issues would be akin to the type of proposal announced by Qatar
Airways to start an airline in India along with the Qatar Investment Author-
ity. See supra text accompanying notes 223²27.
263. While Naresh Goyal’s investment in Jet Airways and Rakesh Gangwal’s
in Indigo were made on a standalone basis, any prospective investment by
Tony Fernandes in AirAsia India will be colored by the pre-existing investment
by the AirAsia parent. In that sense, while the Jet Airways and Indigo situa-
tions merely involved NRI investments and were treated as such, one cannot
rule out the possibility that the AirAsia case could be categorized under the
foreign airline category for purpose of determining the SOEC requirements
under Indian law.
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investors as part of the process.
264
In India, the dichotomy be-
tween foreign investors that are airlines and those that are non-
airline investors was even more pronounced in the context of its
state-owned carrier, Air India. Since the 2012 policy that opened
the Indian skies to foreign airline investors,
265
a clear and cate-
gorical exception was carved out by which foreign airlines were
not permitted to invest in any shares whatsoever in Air India.
266
In other words, the national carrier was out of bounds for foreign
airline investments.
The debate surrounding the prohibition of foreign airline in-
vestments in Air India, however, has recently grown louder as
the government of India explores methods for privatization of
the airline.
267
Such privatization has become necessary given the
need to rejuvenate its business, as it has not only ceded market
share to leading private carriers, but it also carries a heavy debt
burden.
268
The government’s resistance against allowing foreign airlines
from investing in Air India was, however, met with criticism.
While the need to shield the national carrier against a takeover
by a foreign airline due to concerns regarding safety, security
and consumer protection was understandable, the solution of not
allowing any foreign airline investment at all was an extreme
measure. For instance, foreign airlines would be in a position to
use their managerial and financial capabilities to accomplish a
successful turnaround of the national carrier.
269
By eliminating
264. World Economic Forum, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the examples of
Canada, France, Great Britain and Australia).
265. Press Note 6 of 2012, supra note 20, ¶ 3.0.
266. Id.
267. See Arindam Majumder,Why National Carrier Air India Could Remain
With an Indian Owner, BUS. STANDARD (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/gom-likely-to-rule-out-foreign-owner-for-air-
india-117090600040_1.html; Mihir Mishra, Air India Not to Be Sold to Foreign
Carriers: FDI Policy, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://economictimes.indi-
atimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/air-india-not-to-be-
sold-to-foreign-carriers-fdi-policy/articleshow/60258260.cms; FDI Policy Rules
Out Sale of Stake in Air India to Foreign Airlines, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Aug. 28,
2017), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/fdi-policy-rules-out-sale-
of-stake-in-air-india-to-foreign-airline/story-XDMlzUiEoVWX-
mEt2vTS2ZI.html.
268. Akira Hayakawa, Air India Sale Still Stuck on the Runway, NIKKEI
ASIAN REV. (May 20, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-
Deals/Air-India-sale-still-stuck-on-the-runway.
269. Mishra, supra note 267.
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the possibility of a foreign airline’s participation, however, the
options for resuscitating Air India were confined to a domestic
carrier or to a group of foreign non-airline investors. While the
domestic carrier, Indigo Airlines, has expressed some interest in
Air India’s international business as a means of supplementing
its own dominion over the domestic sector, it is not clear if any
substantial interest has yet been evinced by any significant non-
airline investors.
270
The paternalistic treatment afforded to Air India represented
another peculiarity of the foreign investment regime governing
India’s aviation sector. While the need to impose curbs on invest-
ments by foreign airlines is explicable, a total ban against for-
eign airline investments in Air India is not. The question of
whether Air India needs to continue to be treated differently
from other Indian airlines from a foreign investment perspective
continued to exercise the minds of India’s policy-makers.
Finally, in January 2018, the government altered its policy on
foreign investment and allowed foreign airlines to invest in Air
India so long as they hold³directly or indirectly³no more than
a 49 percent stake in the company.
271
Moreover, the policy states
that the SOEC of Air India shall continue to be vested in Indian
nationals.
272
Clearly, the desire to obtain a suitor for Air India,
especially given its precarious financial position, has compelled
the government to relent from its earlier position. This change
has not made a significant difference in Air India’s divestment
program, as it failed to receive any bids at all.
273
3. Lobbying by the Incumbent Airlines
A more visible manifestation of interest group activity lies in
the Federation of Indian Aviation (FIA) that was formed in
270. Id.
271. Press Note No. 1 (2018 Series): Review of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) Policy on Various Sectors, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion,
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, (Jan. 23, 2018) (India).
272. Id.
273. Mark Thompson, India Tries to Sell its National Airline. It Got Zero
Bids, CNN MONEY (June 1, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/31/invest-
ing/air-india-privatization-fails/index.html?utm_medium=so-
cial&utm_term=image&utm_source=twCNNi&utm_content=2018-06-
01T16%3A42%3A54.
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2006.
274
The FIA consists of the leading incumbent airlines, cur-
rently including Jet Airways, Indigo, SpiceJet, and GoAir.
275
Alt-
hough Air India was one of the founding members of the FIA, it
subsequently stepped down from the organization.
276
The FIA has been vocal with respect to reforms or policy initi-
atives of the government that have an impact on foreign invest-
ment in India’s airline sector. For example, the FIA vehemently
opposed the entry of AirAsia and Vistara into the Indian mar-
kets on the grounds that not only would it result in overcrowding
of the Indian skies, but also that de facto control over these air-
lines was likely to be exercised by their foreign airline owners.
277
The FIA has also registered its protest with the government
against allowing Qatar Airways to establish an airline in In-
dia.
278
The FIA has done this in response to alleged security con-
cerns.
279
274. Tarun Shukla, Air India Exit Leaves Lobby FIA in Jeopardy, LIVEMINT
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.livemint.com/Companies/r2zL8DCXQZi-
ompnZgZHf3L/Air-India-exit-leaves-lobby-FIA-in-jeopardy.html. See also
About Us, FED’N INDIAN AIRLINES, http://www.fiaindia.in/about.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2018) (specifying the FIA’s role as the “voice of India’s airline in-
dustry” that “provides a platform for consensus building amongst the member
carriers.”).
275. Our Members, FED’N INDIAN AIRLINES, http://www.fiaindia.in/mem-
ber/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
276. See Shukla, Air India Exit Leaves Lobby FIA in Jeopardy, supra note
274 (noting Air India’s realization that it is preferable for it to convey its views
directly to the government rather than to route it through the FIA).
277. Shukla, India’s Airlines Team to Try to Block AirAsia Low Cost Carrier,
supra note 208.
278. Tarun Shukla, Qatar Airways’ India Airline Plan May Face Opposition
from Airlines Lobby FIA, LIVE MINT (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.live-
mint.com/Companies/bqvjRPPtlYyu7Wy84A6VIL/Qatar-Airways-India-
airline-plan-may-face-opposition-from-F.html; Amber Dubey, Why Are We
Scared of Foreign Airlines?, BUS. STANDARD (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.busi-
ness-standard.com/article/opinion/why-are-we-scared-of-foreign-airlines-
117040401257_1.html; Suchetana Ray, Indian Airlines Continue to Oppose
100% FDI. Fear of Qatar Airways’ India Plans?, HINDUSTAN TIMES (June 8,
2017), https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/indian-airlines-con-
tinue-to-oppose-100-fdi-fear-of-qatar-airways-india-plans/story-
tsceIKjwY7uN9FzmlKp8CO.html. Qatar’s proposal and the legal issues sur-
rounding its possible foreign investment structure have been discussed. See
supra text accompanying notes 223²27.
279. Foreign Players Owning Airlines in India May Trigger Security Issues:
FIA, BUS. STANDARD (May 25, 2017), https://www.business-standard.com/arti-
cle/economy-policy/foreign-players-owning-airlines-in-india-may-trigger-secu-
rity-issues-fia-117052501242_1.html; Sindhu Bhattacharya, Indian Carriers
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The FIA also lobbied to put up a stiff, but ultimately unsuc-
cessful, resistance against liberalizing the 5/20 rule.
280
The FIA’s
argument was that while the incumbent airlines had to wait five
years before flying international routes, any relaxation of that
rule will adversely affect them if the newly established airlines
can skirt the requirement of the time-period and begin flying im-
mediately.
281
This argument, however, did not cut ice with the
government which relaxed the rule anyway.
The composition of the FIA is also somewhat unique in that it
creates a schism between various Indian airlines. Its member-
ship currently comprises only the well-established Indian pri-
vate carriers, and this is so following the departure of Air India
from the group. Newly established airlines such as AirAsia and
Vistara have not been brought within the fold of the FIA for ob-
vious reasons, given that the FIA has been vehemently opposing
the entry of those airlines into India and the benefits conferred
upon them by the regulatory policy.
282
Some have argued that
the composition of the FIA smacks of “crony capitalism” as it is
a proclaimed defender of the interests of the well-established
players at the cost of other entrants.
283
In all, these examples reflect the operation of the interest
group theory in the Indian aviation sector that may explain the
shape that foreign investment regulation has taken over the
years. While the Indian government has seemingly taken bold
steps to allow 100 percent foreign investment in this sensitive
sector, the problems highlighted in this Part indicate that in
practice it is unlikely that foreign investors would be able to en-
joy full freedom in entering into and exiting from the Indian
market. Several underlying factors continue to inhibit foreign
investments, such that it may be difficult to translate the gov-
ernment’s overt pronouncements into action.
Are Against Qatar Airways’ India Plans and Their Points are Valid; Govt
Should Take Heed, FIRSTPOST (May 25, 2017), https://www.firstpost.com/busi-
ness/indian-carriers-are-against-qatar-airways-india-plans-and-their-points-
are-valid-govt-should-take-heed-3481285.html.
280. For a discussion of this rule and its implications, see supra text accom-
panying notes 150²53.
281. Neha Gupta Kapoor, India’s Civil Aviation Ministry Changes 5/20 Rule,
BUS. TRAVELLER (June 16, 2016), https://www.businesstravel-
ler.com/news/2016/06/16/428370/.
282. Shukla, Air India Exit Leaves Lobby FIA in Jeopardy, supra note 274.
283. Id. (quoting a former executive director of Air India).
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IV. TREATMENT UNDER BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS
Having extensively discussed the nationality requirements
under domestic Indian law, this article now addresses some is-
sues that will likely arise under the “external bolt,”
284
wherein
SOEC requirements are stipulated in bilateral ASAs
285
between
India and other countries. While the Indian government can uni-
laterally disengage the internal bolt, matters become somewhat
complicated given the questions of reciprocity that arise under
the ASAs.
This issue is somewhat unique to India. The bilateral treat-
ment problem arises only when a country relaxes the SOEC re-
quirements for foreign investment with respect to its interna-
tional sector.
286
India is arguably the only country to liberalize
foreign investment norms to allow foreign investors without any
restrictions on nationalities to take majority ownership and con-
trol in airlines that operate internationally.
287
To that extent,
how India deals with the bilateral issues may be relevant for
other countries that might liberalize their foreign investment in
the aviation sector in the future.
To be sure, relaxation of the SOEC requirement at a regional
level has been observed over the past few decades. The concept
of “community carrier” has been adopted by the EU, ASEAN,
and the League of Arab States.
288
The community carrier is an
air carrier with an operating license granted by any member
state of the community.
289
Designation as a community carrier
means that an air carrier in the member state of a given com-
munity no longer requires national SOEC, which instead has
284. For a discussion of this concept, see supra text accompanying notes 35²
38.
285. See supra text accompanying note 35.
286. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 649²59.
287. While Australia and New Zealand allow 100 percent foreign investment,
they do so only for the domestic sector, where bilateral aspects do not come into
play. See supra text accompanying notes 83²87. Moreover, while Hong Kong
and Singapore follow the PPB approach, they do not appear to eliminate re-
quirements that might attract de facto control. For a discussion of the issues,
see supra text accompanying notes 78²82.
288. See LEE, supra note 75, at 45²82.
289. See Council Regulation 2407/92 of July 23, 1992, Licensing of Air Carri-
ers, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1 (EC).
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been redefined as community SOEC.
290
For instance, a now-de-
funct, Luxembourg-registered cargo airline, Cargo Lion, had no
Luxembourg national ownership interest; a German national
owned 49 percent of it, a Swiss national possessed another 41
percent, and a UK and a Canadian national each had 5 per-
cent.
291
Apart from the aforementioned developments, on routes gov-
erned by an ASA between two states, SOEC restrictions in the
agreement require that a state party designate only carriers that
are substantially owned and effectively controlled by its own na-
tionals.
292
For instance, the Air Services Agreement between In-
dia and the United States stipulates ownership and control re-
strictions in Article 4, which is entitled Revocation of Authoriza-
tion: “Either Party may revoke, suspend or limit the operating
authorizations or technical permissions of an airline designated
by the other Party where: substantial ownership and effective
control of that airline are not vested in the other Party, the
Party’s nationals, or both. . . .”
293
Under this dispensation, for instance, Jet Airways’ traffic
rights could be revoked or suspended by the United States if the
airline ceases to be substantially owned or effectively controlled
by Indian nationals. This external restriction effectively re-
strains India’s national air carriers from attracting sizeable for-
eign investment. Consequently, Indian airlines will ensure that
they limit foreign investment to the previous level of 49 percent.
Thus, while the nationality requirements have been liberalized
under domestic Indian law (i.e. internal bolt), the restrictions
under the ASAs (i.e. external bolt) continue to constrain foreign
investment in India’s aviation industry. To that extent, the only
practical implication of the recent reforms is that an Indian com-
pany can now set up an airline with foreign investors while fly-
ing only domestic routes. Among existing airlines, GoAir has not
290. PETER P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER
SPACE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 136 (2003).
291. Havel supra note 7, at 13208²09.
292. Barring some exceptions, the ASAs that India has entered into with sev-
eral countries contain such SOEC restrictions. See Tarun Shukla,Will Foreign
Airlines Fly Into India?, LIVE MINT (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.live-
mint.com/Companies/ZgSMp1012FBFMt3udUXP9J/Will-foreign-airlines-fly-
into-India.html.
293. Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of India and the
Government of the United States of America, India-U.S., Apr. 14, 2005, 7
U.S.T. 275.
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started operations on international routes. Hence, it is free to
obtain foreign investment of more than 49 percent without being
constrained by ASA, so long as it is satisfied with operating only
domestic routes.
294
If India can amend the ownership and control clause in consul-
tation with the country concerned, the foreign investment oppor-
tunity for Indian airlines will increase. Indeed, some states are
making an effort to liberalize the ownership and control re-
strictions in their ASAs. In particular, Brazil, Chile, Columbia,
Egypt, Indonesia, Switzerland, and Vietnam reported that they
are in the process of replacing traditional substantial ownership
and control with “principal place of business and effective regu-
latory control” in their ASAs.
295
Obviously, their bilateral part-
ners must also agree to the change.
With regards to bilateral arrangements, one option is that In-
dia can consider the United States’ position. The United States
294. For the future, however, GoAir too has been contemplating operations
on international routes. Mihir Mishra & Anirban Chowdhury, GoAir Says Air-
line Will be Available to Fly International, ECON. TIMES (June 2, 2016),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines-/-avia-
tion/goair-says-airline-will-be-available-to-fly-international/arti-
cleshow/52554718.cms; GoAir to Start International Flights by End of 2017,
ASIAN AGE (June 23, 2017), http://www.asianage.com/metros/mum-
bai/230617/goair-to-start-international-flights-by-end-of-2017.html.
295. See ICAO, Differences Between Carrier Ownership and Control Princi-
ples in Designation Clauses in Air Services Agreements and National Laws
Regulating the Subject, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/94 (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/Work-
ingPapers/ATConf.6.WP.94.2.en.pdf; ICAO, Proposal for the Liberalization of
Air Carrier Ownership and Control, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/29 (Feb.
13,2013), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/Work-
ingPapers/ATConf6-wp029_en.pdf; ICAO, Market Access Restrictions, ICAO
Doc. ATConf/6-WP/59 (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.icao.int/Meet-
ings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp059_en.pdf; ICAO, Egyp-
tian Experience in the Liberalization of Air Carrier Ownership, ICAO Doc.
ATConf/6-WP/41 (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Docu-
ments/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp041_en.pdf; ICAO, Air Carrier Ownership
and Control Principle, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/84 (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-
wp084_en.pdf; ICAO, Air Carrier Ownership and Control Clauses in Bilateral
Air Services Agreements, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/49 (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-
wp049_en.pdf; ICAO, Vietnam’s Air Transport Market, Legislations and Regu-
lations and Policy During 2003²2013, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-IP/22 (Mar. 17,
2013), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/Work-
ingPapers/ATConf6-ip022_en.pdf.
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has displayed a willingness to ease the restrictions either based
on reciprocity or in cases where its interests are not jeopardized
by a higher percentage of foreign ownership.
296
Indeed, the
United States has selectively waived the nationality clause in
cases where the airlines of partner states have been acquired by
non-nationals.
297
To give effect to India’s liberalization of domestic norms, how-
ever, India must also be able to convince its partners under bi-
lateral ASAs to either amend or waive the nationality re-
strictions in the form of the SOEC requirements. This would re-
quire negotiations on a piecemeal basis with different countries,
which would be cumbersome.
In order to overcome such negotiation problems, other methods
have been suggested. These include the adoption of model Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) clauses “to deal
with ownership and control requirements with flexibility with-
out the need to change the existing regime.”
298
This would in-
volve using expansive criteria for the interpretation of the SOEC
requirements under the bilateral ASAs. It has also been sug-
gested that states, such as India, which have liberalized their
foreign investment norms, could publicize their position as it
pertains to the conditions upon which they would accept foreign
carriers, so that an appropriate network can be created among
states to implement the reforms.
299
It is clear that the domestic reforms that India has introduced
would be problematic to implement internationally, given the bi-
lateral nature of the rights governing international air traffic.
296. Lykotrafiti, supra note 8, at 672.
297. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 655; See also Quantitative Air Ser-
vices Agreements Review (QUASAR): Part B: Preliminary Results, ¶ 68, WTO
Doc. S/C/W/270/Add.1 (2006), http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/quasar_partb_e.pdf (noting that “substantial
ownership requirements, but also the effective control prerequisite, are often
waived in practice. Aerolineas Argentinas, for instance, was never denied the
right to fly although it had two successive Spanish majority owners. The same
was true for Sabena when it was owned by Air France and then by Swissair.”).
Similarly, the U.S. did not suspend the traffic rights of Cargo Lion. See Trans-
lux International Airlines SA d/b/a Cargo Lion, D.O.T. Docket OST 98-4329
(1998).
298. Chang, et al., supra note 4, at 170. See also ICAO, ICAO Template Air
Service Agreements (2009), https://www.icao.int/Meet-
ings/AMC/MA/ICAN2009/templateairservicesagreements.pdf.
299. Id.
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While several possible measures have been bandied about in the
literature, it remains to be seen whether a practical solution is
yet available.
CONCLUSION
India is a leading player in the global aviation market, so legal
reforms surrounding foreign investment in its aviation industry
are of wide interest internationally. India has made rapid strides
in liberalizing its overly protected airline industry for the last
two decades, particularly in order to rescue the troubled domes-
tic airline sector.
300
From being one of the most restrictive mar-
kets for foreign investment in the airline industry, it has meta-
morphosed into one of the most liberal within a relatively short
span of time. The most important changes emerged in 2012
when India permitted foreign airlines to invest up to 49 percent
in the airline industry and in 2016 when it increased the limit
up to which non-airline investors can invest to 100 percent.
301
Although the reforms appear to be expansive and significant
at the outset, there are obvious, as well as invisible constraints,
and it is too early to speculate how and to what extent the airline
industry will take advantage of the prevailing policy on foreign
investment in the airline industry in India. At the same time,
some foreign airlines, such as Etihad Airways, AirAsia, and Sin-
gapore Airlines, have capitalized on the reforms and have en-
tered the Indian market, while Qatar Airways and other airlines
are still waiting in the wings.
302
The liberalization of foreign in-
vestment in the Indian airline industry, however, also reveals a
story that sketches out the interplay between a complex array of
factors. The interaction between Indian governmental authori-
ties, on the one hand, and other interest groups, such as incum-
bent industry players, the new entrants, and the industry body
represented by the FIA, has not been smooth, to say the least.
Allegations of regulatory capture and crony capitalism are abun-
dant.
303
In the end, given that the reforms have been brought
about through various policy pronouncements issued by the In-
dian government from time to time, it is not clear whether, and
300. Tan, supra note 102, at 462.
301. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
303. See supra Part III.D.
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to what extent, the actions of the government are justiciable be-
fore a court of law.
304
Thus, it might very well be that courts may
have a limited role to play on this count.
If the domestic legal regime governing foreign investment in
the airline sector is complicated, the order of magnitude is sig-
nificantly enhanced in the treatment of SOEC requirements un-
der bilateral ASAs that India has signed with various countries.
The ASAs give rise to a patent risk that an Indian airline that
has accepted foreign investment in accordance with the fully lib-
eralized policy may not be able to operate international routes
with such an ownership structure. Unless the Indian govern-
ment embarks upon the gargantuan exercise of either negotiat-
ing alterations or waivers with its counterparts, no satisfactory
long-term solution is likely to emerge.
India’s aviation sector has demonstrated strong growth, and
will continue to do so, “despite facing numerous policy and reg-
ulatory challenges.”
305
The entry of three foreign airlines into the
Indian markets over the last five years
306
is evidence that there
are takers for India’s regulatory approach. The further growth
potential of the industry, however, can be unleashed through
continued redesign of this policy, as well as its effective imple-
mentation.
The primary goal of this article has been to analyze the new
foreign investment regime in the airline industry in India. A big-
ger question is whether India’s new approach can impact other
states. It is worth reiterating that India’s status in the interna-
tional aviation community is exceptional.
307
The fact that such
an enormous market made a legislative reform in the SOEC re-
quirement may portend that the nationality norm in the airline
industry is no longer unbreakable.
Indeed, the orthodox position that the SOEC requirement is
an immutable condition in the airline industry has been facing
304. Some legal challenges are pending before courts, but courts have not
been quick to interfere. See, e.g., supra note 198.
305. India’s Aviation Market Surges 20% on Economic Growth and Low Fuel
Prices, CAPA: CENTRE AVIATION (June 3, 2016), https://centreforavi-
ation.com/insights/analysis/iata-indias-aviation-market-surges-20-on-eco-
nomic-growth-and-low-fuel-prices-283494.
306. Saritha Rai, Foreign Airlines Jostle for a Piece of India’s Airline Market,
FORBES (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/saritha-
rai/2013/09/20/foreign-airlines-jostle-for-a-piece-of-indias-airline-mar-
ket/#5c4890902949.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 15²17.
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challenges. The concept of “community carrier” certainly diluted
the nationality requirement. The ownership and control of air-
lines in EU member states has been redefined as EU ownership
and control, rather than national ownership and control require-
ment.
308
To a lesser extent, ASEAN and the League of Arab
States adopted regional agreements that allow community car-
riers.
309
In Asia, more states have begun to mitigate the effective
control inquiries when granting operation of joint venture air-
lines.
310
These measures do not, however, result directly from
the legislative reform of SOEC requirements. Thus, it is arbi-
trary by its nature and lacks the regulatory certainty and pre-
dictability that are much sought after by foreign investors.
India’s bold approach is a great step forward. It clearly sets out
changes by regulatory reform so that foreign investors will de-
rive greater certainty and comfort with cross-border investment
in the airline industry in India. India, once one of the most pro-
tective states in the foreign investment regime, has adopted the
most liberalized approach. This fact is significant enough to
make other states, particularly in Asia, revisit their SOEC re-
quirements on the airline industry. It will be illuminating to see
how and to what extent other states are influenced by India’s
new way forward.
308. See supra note 290.
309. See 2009 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS), May
20, 2009; 2010 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement for the Full Liberalisation of
Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS), No. 12, 2010; Agreement for the Liberal-
ization of Air Transport Between the Arab States, Dec. 2004.
310. See Lee & Dy,Mitigating ¶Effective Control’ Restriction on Joint Venture
Airlines in Asia: Philippines Air Asia Case, supra note 14.
